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Arbitration of Trust Disputes:
Two Bodies of Law Collide
S.I. Strong*
Once considered nothing more than “mere” estate planning devices, trusts play a large
and growing role in the international economy, holding trillions of dollars of assets and
generating billions of dollars of income each year. However, the rising popularity of both
commercial and non-commercial trusts has led to an explosion in hostile trust litigation, leading
settlors and trustees to search for new and less expensive ways to resolve trust-related disputes.
One possible solution involves use of a mandatory arbitration provision in the trust itself.
However, the unique, multiparty nature of trust disputes often makes this sort of arbitration
highly controversial. Several U.S. states have taken diametrically opposed positions on
mandatory trust arbitration, although the vast majority of jurisdictions have not yet addressed this
matter.
This Article considers the various issues that arise when two separate bodies of law –
trust law and arbitration law – collide, using recent developments in the field of international
commercial arbitration to address some of the more intransigent problems facing trust
arbitration. The Article focuses on five areas of concern: the potential for impermissible ouster
of the courts, the operability and effectiveness of the arbitration provision, the extent to which
the arbitration provision is binding on the party against whom arbitration is asserted, proper
representation of parties and arbitrability. In so doing, this Article introduces a number of new
judicial decisions not previously considered in the scholarly literature and brings using a
uniquely comparative and international perspective to the debate regarding the jurisprudential
propriety of mandatory trust arbitration.
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Trusts and their civil law equivalents, often known as foundations or associations,1 play a large
and growing role in the international economy. Not only do trust vehicles hold assets valued in

* D.Phil., University of Oxford (U.K.); Ph.D., University of Cambridge (U.K.); J.D., Duke University; M.P.W.,
University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Davis. The author, who is admitted to practice as
an attorney in New York and Illinois and as a solicitor in England and Wales, is the Henry G. Schermers Fellow at
the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law as well as Associate Professor of Law at the University of
Missouri. The author is also a member of the American Law Institute (ALI) Consultative Groups for both the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration.
Many thanks are due David M. English, David Horton and John H. Langbein for comments and insights provided on
earlier drafts of this Article. All errors of course remain the author’s own.
1

Although trusts developed historically as a common law device, civil law jurisdictions are becoming increasingly
involved in this field, either through the development of their own domestic forms of trusts or the recognition of
trusts formed in common law countries. See Henry Christensen III, Foreign Trusts and Alternative Vehicles, 1902
PLI/CORP. 323, §4 (Aug. 18-19, 2011); Adair Dyer, International Recognition and Adoption of Trusts: The
Influence of the Hague Convention, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989 (1999); Dante Figueroa, Civil Law Trusts in
Latin America: Is the Lack of Trusts an Impediment for Expanding Business Opportunities in Latin America? 24
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 701, 703-07, 721-51 (2007); Frances H. Foster, American Trust Law in a Chinese Mirror,
94 MINN. L. REV. 602, 637-50 (2010); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 437-45 (1998); Michael Hwang, Arbitration of
Trust Disputes, in GUIDE TO THE WORLD’S LEADING EXPERTS IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 83, 84 (Legal Media
Group ed., 2009); John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107
YALE L.J. 165, 186 (1997) [hereinafter Langbein, Commercial Trusts]; John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis
of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629, 632-43, 669-71 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, Contractarian];
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the trillions of dollars and generate billions of dollars each year in income, but administrators and
trustees accumulate similarly massive amounts in annual fees.2 With a rising number of trusts
moving into the international realm so as to take advantage of favorable tax laws in various
offshore jurisdictions, trusts have become an issue of global importance.3 Furthermore, trusts are
becoming increasingly commercial in nature, leaving behind their reputation as mere estate
planning devices.4
The combination of international and commercial characteristics might suggest that
arbitration would be an appropriate means of resolving trust disputes, since arbitration is very
much the preferred means of resolving other types of international commercial controversies.5
Indeed, such an approach might already appear to be standard procedure, given the number of
trusts that currently appear in arbitrations in the United States and elsewhere.6 However, the vast

Maurizio Luponi, The Civil Law Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 967, 970-73 (1999); Julien Perrin, The
Recognition of Trusts and Their Use in Estate Planning Under Continental Laws, 10 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 629, 630
(2008); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: An Invitation to Comparativists, 13
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 321, 322 (2003); Tina Wüstemann, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, in NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2007, 33, 33-35 (Christoph Müller ed., 2007). For
ease of discussion, the term “trust” will be used to refer to both civil law and common law devices, unless otherwise
indicated.
2
See David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. __, *22
(forthcoming 2012) (noting irrevocable trusts in the United States “generated $188 billion in income and $4.7 billion
in trustees’ fees” in 2008 alone); Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 177-78 (estimating in 1997 that
commercial trusts held assets in the range of $11.6 trillion, with non-commercial trusts holding an additional $672
billion).
3
See Wüstemann, supra note 1, at 33-34. The expanded use of international trusts has been facilitated by the
enactment of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition (Hague Convention
on Trusts). See Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition, 1 July 1985, 23 I.L.M. 1389,
1389-92 (1984) [hereinafter Hague Convention on Trusts]. The Hague Convention on Trusts has been ratified or
acceded to by Australia, Canada, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, The Netherlands, San Marino,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. See Hague Convention on Trusts, Status, available at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=59. It has been signed but not ratified by Cyprus,
France and the United States. See id.
4
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 166.
5
See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 68-71 (2009).
6
Evidence of trust-related arbitration can be found in various judicial opinions. See Dallah Real Estate & Tourism
Holding Co. v. Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46, ¶¶1-2, 7 (Lord Mance); Fili Shipping Co. Ltd. Premium Nafta Products
Ltd, [2007] UKHL 40 ¶¶3-5 (Lord Hoffman), on appeal from Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov [2007] 1 All
E.R. (Comm.) 891; The Trustees of the Edmond Stern Settlement v. Levy, [2009] EWHC 14 (TCC), ¶¶1-2;
Laughton v. CGI Tech. & Sol’ns, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 262, 263-64 (D. Mass. 2009); Delaney Elec. Co., Inc. v.
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majority of these arbitrations cannot really be considered “trust disputes” per se, since they arise
out of contractual relationships between the trust and unrelated third parties and typically involve
matters that are entirely external to the trust itself.7
However, these kinds of external, third party disputes are not the only type of trustrelated conflicts that exist, nor indeed are they the most common. Instead, “[m]ost trust disputes
are internal disputes”8 that address matters relating to the inner workings of the trust and
involving controversies between some or all of the various parties to a trust, including trustees,
protectors and/or beneficiaries.9
These types of matters are quite different from external trust disputes, not only in terms
of their subject matter (which can involve specialized questions of trust law) but also in terms of
the manner in which arbitration arises. Arbitration with external third parties is typically based
on an arbitration clause found in an individual contract made between the trust and the third
party. Arbitration of internal trust disputes, on the other hand, usually arises as a result of a
mandatory arbitration provision found in the trust itself.10

Schiessle, 601 N.E. 2d 978, 980 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); United States Trust Co., N.A. v. Cavalieri, No.
HHDCV070513653S, 2008 WL 1822721, at *1 (Conn. Super. Apr. 1, 2008).
7
Such proceedings are largely uncontroversial, particularly in jurisdictions with legislation giving trustees the
explicit power to enter into nonjudical means of dispute resolution. This type of legislation has long been available,
but is becoming increasingly popular. See infra notes 154-77 and accompanying text.
8
Hwang, supra note 1, at 83. Different commentators define internal and external trust disputes differently. See
Paul Buckle & Carey Olsen, Trust Disputes and ADR, 14 TR. & TRUSTEES 649, 651 (2008); Wüstemann, supra note
1, at 38.
9
See Hague Convention on Trusts, supra note 3, art. 2; DAVID HAYTON ET AL., UNDERHILL AND HAYTON LAW
RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES ¶¶8.157-8.167 (18th ed. 2010); Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 664;
Wüstemann, supra note 1, at 36.
10
Parties to an internal trust dispute could also enter into an arbitration agreement after the dispute has arisen (i.e., a
submission agreement or compromis), but it is usually easier to obtain an arbitration agreement before legal
controversies arise rather than afterward, regardless of whether the matter is related to a trust or not. See GARY B.
BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 37 (2010)
[hereinafter BORN, DRAFTING].
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This latter type of arrangement is much more controversial than arbitration with an
external third party pursuant to a contract existing outside the trust.11 Indeed, some courts have
concluded that mandatory arbitration provisions contained in a trust are unenforceable.12
However, the potential difficulties associated with mandatory trust arbitration have not
diminished the appeal of this particular procedure. Hostile trust litigation is reaching “near
epidemic” levels, and many settlors and trustees view arbitration as an excellent means of
limiting spiraling litigation costs.13
Anecdotal evidence suggests that relatively few trusts currently contain arbitration
provisions.14 However, it is unclear why this is so, given the significant amount of national and
international interest in mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes.15
One reason might be that some residual prejudice against arbitration still exists among
some members of the trust bench and bar.16 For example, questions have been raised about the
adequacy of due process protections in arbitration as well as the ability of arbitrators to handle
the kind of complex, multiparty disputes that often arise in trust law,17 even though every other

11

Although the current interest in mandatory arbitration of trust disputes makes it seem as if the procedure is
relatively new, these issues have been discussed at various times in the past. See Arnold M. Zack, Arbitration:
Step-child of Wills and Estates, 11 ARB. J. 179 (1956); Blaine Covington Janin, Comment, The Validity of
Arbitration Provisions in Trust Instruments, 55 CAL. L. REV. 521 (1967).
12
See Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 614-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted, 257 P. 3d
1129 (2011); Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 310 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011), petition for review filed Sept. 8, 2011.
13
Lawrence Cohen & Marcus Staff, The Arbitration of Trust Disputes, 7 J. INT’L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 203, 203
(1999); see also American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC), Arbitration Task Force Report 22 (Sept.
2006), available at http://www.mnbar.org/sections/probatetrust/ACTEC%20Arbitration%20Task%20Force%20Report-2006.pdf; Georg von Segesser, Arbitrability in Estate
and Trust Litigation, in PAPERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF ESTATE AND TRUST LAW – 2000 21, 21
(Rosalind F. Atherton ed. 2001); Wüstemann, supra note 1, at 33-34.
14
See Wüstemann, supra note 1, at 41; see also Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: Defining the
Parameters for Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 118, 119 (2011).
15
See Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions: A Powerful Tool to Prevent
Contentious and Costly Trust Litigation, But Are They Enforceable? 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 351, 352-53
(2007); Horton, supra note 2, at *3; Katzen, supra note 14, at 118-19; Wüstemann, supra note 1, at 41.
16
See ACTEC, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing the “blinding prejudice” to arbitration in contemporary trust and
estates practice).
17
See Gerardo J. Bosques-Hernández, Arbitration Clauses in Trusts: The U.S. Developments and a Comparative
Perspective, 3 REVISTA PARA EL ANALISIS DEL DERECHO (INDRET) 1, 5, 15 (2008), available at
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area of law has overcome these kinds of worries about the legitimacy of the arbitral process.18
However, the root of the problem may simply be that “[m]any trust practitioners have never
encountered arbitration.”19 While trust lawyers are often proud of the specialized nature of their
practice, this may be one instance where the traditional isolation of the trust bench and bar has
resulted in trust specialists’ not being exposed to some of the more positive advances that have
been made recently in arbitration law.20
Alternatively, the minimal use of mandatory arbitration provisions in trusts may be due to
concerns about the enforceability of such clauses. This hesitancy is often said to be the result of
the relatively small number of judicial opinions in this area of law 21 and the wide publicity given
to the few negative decisions that exist.22 No lawyer wants his or her client to be the precedentsetting test case in a developing area of law, even if the outcome is ultimately in the client’s
favor.
However, the situation may not be as problematic as is commonly believed. Indeed,
there are a number of signs that mandatory trust arbitration is gaining momentum in the United
States and elsewhere. For example, a growing number of jurisdictions are addressing issues
relating to mandatory trust arbitration through legislative means.23 Furthermore, several older

http://www.indret.com/pdf/559_en.pdf; E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent
Testator From Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275,
307-14 (1999); Wüstemann, supra note 1, at 40-41.
18
See BORN, supra note 5, at 775; Horton, supra note 2, at *14, *16-20.
19
Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 206.
20
This isolation arises as a result of the specialized nature of trust law and procedure. See James W. Martin, Ten
Tips for Handling Complex Probate, 84 FLA. B.J. 45-52 (Feb. 2010). Some jurisdictions even require trust disputes
to be brought in specialized probate or chancery courts. See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES: INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS 626 (2010).
21
See Katzen, supra note 14, at 118-19; Wüstemann, supra note 1, at 34, 49.
22
See Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 614-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted, 257 P. 3d
1129 (2011); Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 310 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011), petition for review filed Sept. 8, 2011.
23
See infra notes 154-77 and accompanying text.
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cases, including In re Jacobovitz’ Will,24 Meredith’s Estate,25 and Schoneberger v. Oelze,26 that
have been frequently cited for the proposition that arbitration of trust disputes is impermissible
have all been abrogated legislatively or judicially, even though those subsequent decisions have
not received the same kind of attention that negative precedents have. Finally, the amount of law
concerning arbitration of trust dispute is not perhaps as “thin and underdeveloped” as it is said to
be, since a number of relevant judicial decisions appear to have been largely overlooked by legal
commentators.27
Indeed, the perceived scarcity of what might be considered “clear” authority in this field
appears to have led some judges and practitioners to adopt a view that is “more conservative
towards ADR than the law actually is today,” even though the lack of subject-specific precedent
would normally seem to suggest “that the general principles of arbitration law . . . should apply
equally to trust cases.”28 This observation leads to another reason why mandatory trust
arbitration may appear to be a somewhat questionable proposition: very little analysis of the
issues relating to the arbitration of internal trust disputes has been conducted by experts in
arbitration.29 Instead, most of the commentary in this field has come from the trust community.
While it is true that trust arbitration gives rise to a number of challenges not seen in other
areas of law, many modern trusts do not reflect any “necessary element of the probate court, or

24

Compare In re Jacobovitz’ Will, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 1968), with In re Blumenkrantz, 824
N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 2006).
25
Compare Meredith’s Estate, 266 N.W. 351 (Mich. 1936), with In re Nestorovski Estate, 769 N.W. 2d 720, 732
(Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
26
See Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1082-83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), superseded by statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §14-10205 (2011), as recognized in Jones v. Fink, No. CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb.
22, 2011).
27
Katzen, supra note 14, at 118-19. These newly discovered decisions are introduced and discussed throughout this
Article.
28
Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 211.
29
For example, the leading database on international arbitration, kluwerarbitration.com, does not appear to include
any articles focusing on the arbitration of trust disputes. See kluwerarbitration.com (searching for the word “trust”
as a title of any piece of commentary).
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family wealth transfer, or even of donative transfer”30 that would make the participation of
commercial and arbitration lawyers in this discussion inappropriate. Indeed, the large number of
commercial trusts currently in use31 and the significant degree of overlap between commercial
trusts, corporations and other business associations suggests that commercial lawyers should be
integrally involved in the debate about mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes.32
This is not to say that the arbitral community has been actively excluded from the
discussion in any way. Instead, the problem seems to be that experts in arbitration appear
somewhat unaware of the unique issues associated with mandatory trust arbitration.33 In many
ways, the arbitration community appears to be as isolated from other areas of practice as the trust
community is.
This type of practical and jurisprudential segregation cannot continue. Instead, it is high
time that these two areas of specialization, trust law and arbitration law, came together to address
questions relating to the arbitration of internal trust disputes through inclusion of an arbitral
provision in the trust instrument. Indeed, as discussed below, several recent developments in
30

Christensen, supra note 1, §2.
See Robert Flannigan, Business Applications of the Express Trust, 36 ALBERTA L. REV. 630, 630 (1998).
32
Numerous similarities exist between commercial trusts and other types of business associations. See Christensen,
supra note 1, §2; Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 1, at 434; Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 631; Paul B.
Miller, The Future for Business Trusts: A Comparative Analysis of Canadian and American Uniform Legislation,
36 QUEEN’S L.J. 443, 452-55, 474-78, 482, 499 (2011).
33
Although two leading arbitral institutions – the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) – have both taken steps to address the special needs of parties involved in the
arbitration of trust disputes, these efforts appear to be isolated events. See AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules,
effective 1 June 2009, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22005; ICC Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes,
19 ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 9 (2008) [hereinafter ICC Model Trust Clause], available on
http://www.iccdrl.com/CODE/LevelThree.asp?page=Commission%20Reports&tocxml=ltoc_CommReportsAll.xml
&tocxsl=DoubleToc.xsl&contentxml=CR_0035.xml&contentxsl=arbSingle.xsl&L1=Commission%20Reports&L2=
&Locator=9&AUTH=&nb=10. Indeed, neither the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules nor the ICC Model
Trust Clause have yet been mentioned in any judicial opinion. Furthermore, these initiatives have been largely
ignored in commentary generated by the trust bar, with the AAA and ICC’s recent efforts only being discussed in
passing. See Horton, supra note 2, at *7; Katzen, supra note 14, at 130-32. However, the author analyzes the AAA
and ICC initiatives in detail in two forthcoming articles. See S.I. Strong, Empowering Settlors: How Proper
Language Can Increase the Enforceability of a Mandatory Arbitration Provision in a Trust (forthcoming 2012)
[hereinafter Strong, Enforceability]; S.I. Strong, Arbitration Arising Out of a Provision Found in a Commercial or
Other Trust: Why Special Procedures Are Necessary and What Those Procedures Must Include, under
consideration by ARB. INT’L (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Strong, Procedures].
31

8

arbitration law offer new solutions to some of the more intransigent problems facing mandatory
arbitration of trust disputes.34 This Article therefore aims to unite the two bodies of law in a way
that is useful to courts, commentators and counsel in both fields.
The structure of the Article is as follows. First, Section II sets the stage by describing the
basic requirements for a trust as well as the wide variety of commercial and other types of trusts
that currently exist. This analysis is important because it identifies some of the qualities of trusts
that can prove problematic for arbitration while also dispelling the myth that trusts are used only
in the testamentary or estate-planning context. This discussion also provides those who do not
specialize in trust law with a basic understanding of the relevant principles of law and practice,
although there are some elements that trust law experts may find intriguing as well.
Section III forms the core of the Article. This discussion introduces the various problems
that can arise when parties attempt to incorporate arbitration provisions into trusts and analyzes
whether and to what extent mandatory trust arbitration is enforceable as a matter of law. The
focus here is on: (1) the potential for arbitration to oust the jurisdiction of the courts
impermissibly; (2) questions about the operability and effectiveness of the arbitration provision
itself; (3) whether and to what extent the arbitration provision will be binding on the party
seeking to avoid arbitration; (4) proper representation of parties, particularly those who may be
unborn, unascertained or legally incompetent at the time the dispute arises; and (5) arbitrability
of internal trust disputes.35 In considering these issues, the text not only focuses on solutions that
have been proposed as a matter of trust law, but also introduces several new ideas based on
arbitration law.

34
35

See infra notes 281-320, 322-378, 433-90 and accompanying text.
See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 209.
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Section IV pulls the various strands of discussion together and concludes the Article with
some final observations. This section also contains several suggestions about future areas of
research concerning mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes.
Before beginning, it is important to describe the parameters of the current analysis. First,
this Article focuses on the enforceability of mandatory arbitration provisions found in trusts.
While there are a number of important issues to consider with respect to both external trust
disputes and internal trust disputes subject to a post-dispute submission agreement, there is
insufficient space to discuss those matters here.36 Therefore, this Article restricts itself to the
question of whether and to what extent parties to the trust can be bound by an arbitration
provision found in the trust itself.
Second, the discussion will not, for the most part, attempt to differentiate between
commercial and other types of trusts. This is not because these distinctions are not important, for
they very well may be.37 Indeed, some jurisdictions treat business trusts as more akin to
corporations than to trusts, at least in certain contexts,38 and it may be that commercial trusts
could or should be considered more amenable to mandatory trust arbitration than other kinds of
trusts.39 However, scholarly and judicial commentary has not yet begun to distinguish between

36

For example, there is a large body of law concerning the rights of creditors to attach or attack a trust, and
eventually it would be useful to consider whether those issues are amenable to mandatory arbitration. See HAYTON
ET AL., supra note 9, ¶¶7.1, 16.1-19.2; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 413-25.
37
See David Fox, Non-excludable Trustee Duties, 17 TR. & TRUSTEES 17, 26 (2011); Steven L. Schwarcz,
Fiduciaries With Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1867, 1870, 1877-78 (2010). But see Flannigan, supra
note 31, at 630-31.
38
See Christensen, supra note 1, §2 (noting that U.S. “[b]usiness trusts, although trusts for property law purposes,
are taxed as corporations because they conduct a business”); see also HAYTON ET AL., supra note 9, ¶1.133 (noting
that beneficiaries of commercial trusts in England may be treated differently than beneficiaries of private family
trusts).
39
Analogies in this regard could be drawn to mandatory arbitration of internal corporate disputes as a result of
arbitration provisions found in the company’s corporate charter or bylaws. See Christian Borris, Arbitrability of
Corporate Law Disputes in Germany, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR 55 (C.J.M. Klaassen et al., eds., 2011); Olivier
Caprasse, Objective Arbitrability of Corporate Disputes – Belgium and France, in Klaassen et al., supra, at 79;
Gerard Meijer & Josefina Guzman, The International Recognition of an Arbitration Clause in the Articles of
Association of a Company, in Klaassen et al., supra, at 117.

10

the arbitrability of the two types of trusts, and proper consideration of this matter would require
lengthy analysis. Therefore, these issues are for the most part excluded, although some matters
are raised intermittently.
Third, trust law is becoming increasingly globalized, and this Article introduces a number
of international and comparative concepts relating to the issues presented herein. In particular,
the discussion describes principles of both English and U.S. law as they relate to trusts and
arbitration.40 However, this Article is not intended to present a comprehensive comparative
analysis of the two jurisdictions. Instead, the aim is simply to use the two legal systems as
exemplars of the various problems and responses that can arise in this area of law.
Having laid the foundation for the discussion, the analysis begins with an introduction to
basic principles of trust law, the various types of trusts commonly used today and the theories
underlying modern trust law.

II.

An Introduction to Trusts and Trust Law Theory

Trusts constitute a very specialized field of law and practice, with very few practitioners outside
the probate bar ever having been involved in drafting a trust or litigating a matter involving an
internal trust dispute.41 Indeed, most common law lawyers’ only experience of trusts comes
through law school courses focused on trusts in the testamentary context.42 Lawyers trained in
the civil law tradition may not even have had this minimal amount of exposure to trusts, since

40

These two countries have been chosen for several reasons. First, England and the United States are leaders in
both trust and arbitration law. As such, the principles developed in those nations have persuasive effect elsewhere in
the world. Second, much of the most probing analysis of mandatory trust arbitration comes from England, although
some of the concepts need to be adapted for use in the U.S. legal arena. Third, the author is qualified as an English
solicitor as well as a U.S. attorney and has first-hand experience practicing in London, New York and Chicago.
41
However, commercial lawyers may have experience litigating or arbitrating an external trust dispute. See supra
note 6 and accompanying text.
42
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 165.
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trusts developed as a creature of the common law and are still associated primarily with that legal
tradition.43
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a comprehensive outline of the law
of trusts,44 it is nevertheless useful to provide a brief introduction to this field of law so as to lay
the proper foundation for more detailed discussions of mandatory arbitration of internal trust
disputes. The following subsections will therefore outline what a trust is as well as the types of
trusts currently in use. The discussion also summarizes some of the various theories used to
describe trusts, since those theories play an important role in mandatory trust arbitration.

A.

What is a Trust

The device now known as a trust originally developed in medieval England as a means of
safeguarding and transferring wealth.45 Although trusts have changed over the years in both
their uses and forms, some factors have remained constant, including the elements necessary to
establish a trust.46 While the specific requirements associated with creating a trust vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, one internationally recognized set of criteria can be found in the
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition (Hague
Convention on Trusts).47 That instrument states that:
the term “trust” refers to the legal relationships created – inter vivos or on death –
by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under the control of a
trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified purpose.
A trust has the following characteristics –
43

See supra note 1.
More detailed reading on trusts and their civil law equivalents exists elsewhere. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 9
(discussing English trust law); MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20 (discussing U.S. trust law); Christensen, supra
note 1 (discussing civil law equivalents to the trust).
45
See Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 632-43, 669-71.
46
See id. at 632-43, 669-71; see also HAYTON ET AL., supra note 9, ¶1.95 (describing English trusts); MCGOVERN ET
AL., supra note 20, at 369.
47
See Hague Convention on Trusts, supra note 3.
44
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a) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the trustee’s
own estate;
b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name of
another person on behalf of the trustee;
c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which he is
accountable, to manage, employ or dispose of the assets in accordance
with the terms of the trust and the special duties imposed upon him by
law.
The reservation by the settlor of certain rights and powers, and the fact that the
trustee may himself have rights as a beneficiary, are not necessarily inconsistent
with the existence of a trust.48
Thus, the three most important persons in a trust relationship are the settlor (also called
the donor), who creates and funds the trust; the trustee, who holds legal title to the property,
though only for the benefit of the beneficiary; and the beneficiary, who holds equitable title to
the property and receives the benefits of the trust.49 All trusts must have at least one settlor,
trustee and beneficiary, although there may be more than one person in each role (for example,
there may be multiple settlors, multiple trustees and/or multiple beneficiaries). In some cases,
the same person may act in multiple roles (for example, a settlor may also be a trustee, and a
trustee may also be a beneficiary).
Historically, trusts were often created to protect property from creditors, a use which
continues to this day.50 Trusts were also created as a means of ensuring competent
administration of the corpus of the trust in cases where the beneficiary might be incapable of
acting on his or her own behalf (as in cases involving a legal impediment, such as minority) or
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might lack the necessary qualities to act prudently (as in cases involving persons who were
financially unsophisticated or had a tendency toward profligacy).51

B.

Types of Trusts, Including Commercial Trusts

Trusts exist in a wide variety of forms. Although most trusts are created intentionally (i.e.,
“express trusts”), trusts may also be created by statute or by operation of law.52 All express
trusts can be categorized as either a living (inter vivos) or testamentary trust on the one hand and
as either a revocable or irrevocable trust on the other.53
Beyond these basic qualifications, trusts are typically defined by their purpose. Many
trusts (such as dynasty trusts, marital trusts or family trusts) are meant to pass on wealth within a
family, with the quintessential example being a trust created by a parent to benefit a child after
the parent’s death.54 However, trusts serve other purposes as well. For example, some trusts are
created entirely for charitable purposes,55 while others, such as asset protection trusts or credit
shelter trusts, appear to be primarily focused on deterring potential creditors from reaching trust
assets or garnering various tax savings.56
Although family planning trusts are perhaps the most well-known type of trust in the
United States, they are not the most common. Instead, “well over 90% of the money held in trust
in the United States” in recent years has been held “in commercial trusts as opposed to personal
51

See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 9, ¶¶11.1, 11.77-11.78; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 389, 417-20.
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54
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trusts.”57 Commercial trusts are not limited to the United States but have become increasingly
popular in other jurisdictions as well.58 Thus, it has been said that “the role of trusts in
intrafamily wealth transfers is today ‘relatively trivial,’” particularly when compared to the
“enormously important” role of trusts in the business context.59
A brief summary of commercial trusts is useful to provide context for later discussion of
this often overlooked device.60 First, as a definitional matter, a commercial trust (also known as
a business trust) constitutes “a trust that implements bargained-for exchange,” in contrast to the
kind of donative transfers that are more common in a trust created to pass on family wealth.61
Some, but not all, commercial trusts are created by statute.62
Commercial trusts are created for a variety of reasons. Some of these rationales appear
largely similar to those involving non-commercial trusts and therefore suggest that the two kinds
of trusts should be treated similarly in most, if not all, regards.63 For example, both business and
non-business trusts provide protection from insolvency and some forms of taxation while also
creating a fiduciary regime that requires the application of fiduciary duties of loyalty and
prudence.64
However, business trusts also have purposes that are entirely unique to the commercial
realm. For example, parties to commercial trusts are able to take advantage of the trust’s
inherent flexibility and create relationships or procedures that might be difficult or impossible to
57
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achieve as a matter of corporate law, particularly with respect to “matters of internal governance
and . . . the creation of beneficial interests.”65 “Transaction planners designing asset
securitization trusts especially welcome the freedom to carve beneficial interests without regard
to traditional classes of corporate shares,” creating a wide range of “so-called tranches, each
embodied in its own class of trust security.”66
Interest in commercial trusts has grown exponentially in recent years due to the increased
liberalization of laws regarding the use and creation of such devices.67 However, commercial
trusts “are a woefully under-analyzed and underappreciated form of business organization,”
despite their being “critically important” to various capital markets.68 Indeed, many lawyers may
be unaware of what constitutes a commercial trust per se. As it turns out, there are a wide
variety of statutory and common law business trusts currently in use,69 with some of the more
common types including pension trusts, investment or unit trusts (which include mutual funds,
real estate investment trusts (REITs), oil and gas royalty trusts, and asset securitization trusts)
and trusts relating to the issuance of bonds.70 Notably, a number of these types of trusts have
been subject to arbitration of internal trust disputes in the U.S. and elsewhere.71
Interestingly, the increased use of the commercial trust has led to a sharpening of the
debate about the theoretical nature of trusts. While the ideological divide currently reflected in
65
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the legal literature mirrors a similar split seen in the early twentieth century, the issue has
become particularly pressing in light of the current discussion about mandatory trust arbitration.
Although theory can often seem entirely divorced from the practice of law, this is one instance
where the manner in which a device is conceptualized can make a difference in how it is treated
in court.72

C.

The Theoretical Basis of Trusts
1.

The donative theory of trusts

The first and perhaps most prevalent theory of trusts holds that such devices are primarily
donative in nature. This approach is evident in both England and the United States, with one of
the leading treatises on English trust law stating that “[a] trust is not a contract but a unilateral
transfer of assets to a person prepared to accept the office of trustee with the benefits and
burdens attached to such office.”73
Although this statement would seem conclusive, the same treatise also indicates that
general principles of trust law and theory can be overcome by statute.74 In reaching this
conclusion, the authors specifically mention the Arbitration Act 1996, England’s national statute
on arbitration, noting that the Act gives parties the ability to contract out of judicial
determinations of legal issues.75 Thus, while the donative theory of trusts may predominate in
England as a general matter, it may have diminished applicability in cases involving mandatory
arbitration, having been superseded, as it were, by statute.
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The donative theory of trusts is also reflected in the United States, most visibly in the
Restatement of Trusts.76 Interestingly, U.S. adoption of the donative theory of trusts is a
relatively recent innovation, appearing for the first time in the early days of the twentieth
century, when the first Restatement of Trusts was published.77 Prior to that time, courts and
commentators in the United States appear to have been more accepting of the contractual aspects
of trusts, at least as it applied to arbitration.78
Interestingly, the donative theory of trusts does not have to be considered antithetical to
mandatory trust arbitration. Indeed, a number of the reasons enunciated by Austin Scott, the
Reporter of the first Restatement, as justifying the characterization of trusts as donative could be
seen as entirely consistent with mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes.79 For example,
Scott is said to have embraced the donative theory of trusts because he was worried that a more
contractual approach would bring the enforcement of trusts out of the realm of equity and into
the common law.80 This was problematic for Scott because “that fusion might remove the law of
trusts from the nurturing hand of the specialist equity bench, and indeed, that fusion might cause
trust litigation to be subjected to jury trial.”81 “Thus, for Scott, having the Restatement deny the
contractarian character of the trust was a means of buttressing the jury-free preserve of equity
judges.”82 Of course, another way to remove a dispute from jury consideration and put it in the

76

See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 166.
See Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 627, 644-65.
78
See ACTEC, supra note 13, at 13.
79
Interestingly, the first Restatement is said to have adopted the donative approach to trusts not because that theory
prevailed as a matter of jurisprudential discourse (indeed, the contractarian approach had numerous supporters at
that time, including Frederic W. Maitland) but simply because that was the model favored by Scott. See Langbein,
Contractarian, supra note 1, at 627, 644-45.
80
See id. at 648-50.
81
Id. at 648.
82
Id. at 649.
77

18

hands of a decision-maker with special expertise in trust law and procedure is to put it into
arbitration.83
One of the few U.S. decisions to consider the theoretical nature of trusts in the context of
arbitration is Schoneberger v. Oelze.84 Although the decision has been superseded by statute, the
case nevertheless provides a useful demonstration of how legal theory applies in practice.85
Schoneberger arose out of claims for breach of trust and related torts brought by the
beneficiaries of two related family trusts against the trustees.86 The trusts contained a provision
stating that “[a]ny dispute arising in connection with this Trust, including disputes between
Trustee and any beneficiary or among Co-Trustees” was to be arbitrated.87 The beneficiaries
initially filed their suit in court, but the trustees moved for arbitration on the grounds that the
arbitration clause in the trusts constituted “provisions in a written contract” in conformity with
statutory requirements for arbitration, or, alternatively, that the beneficiaries “were equitably
estopped from objecting to arbitration as they were affirmatively seeking benefits under the
Trusts.”88 The beneficiaries alleged in response that “the arbitration provisions were
unenforceable because the Trusts were not contractual agreements” and that, “as non-signatories
to the Trust documents, they had never agreed to arbitrate their claims against the defendants.”89
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In deciding in favor of the beneficiaries, the Arizona Court of Appeal held that “‘the
duties of a trustee stem from duties implied by law’ and the relationships that arise out of a trust
‘are not contractual.’”90 Therefore:
[t]he legal distinctions between a trust and a contract are at the heart of why [the
beneficiaries] cannot be required to arbitrate their claims against the defendants.
Arbitration rests on an exchange of promises. . . . In contrast, a trust does not rest
on an exchange of promises. A trust merely requires a trustor to transfer a
beneficial interest in property to a trustee who, under the trust instrument, relevant
statutes and common law, holds that interest for the beneficiary. The
“undertaking” between trustor and trustee “does not stem from the premise of
mutual assent to an exchange of promises” and “is not properly characterized as
contractual.”91

2.

The contract theory of trusts

Just as the donative theory of contract law has its champions, so, too, does the contractual theory.
Thus, for example, one of the leading commentators on U.S. trust law has said that:
although the typical trust implements a donative transfer, it embodies a contractlike relationship in the underlying deal between the settlor and the trustee about
how the trustee will manage the trust assets and distribute them to the trust
beneficiaries. The difference between a trust and a third-party beneficiary
contract is largely a lawyers’ conceptualism.92
Under this approach, the trust is viewed as “a deal, a bargain about how the trust assets are to be
managed and distributed.”93 Therefore:
[w]hen . . . we enforce a trust, even the conventional donative or personal trust,
we are already in the realm of contract-like behavior. That is why not much turns
on the distinction between donative and commercial trust. In the commercial
setting, the typical wealth-holder, instead of transferring property for his widow
and orphans, is an investor buying shares in an asset pool for the investor’s own
benefit. In either case, the wealth-holder places property at the trustee’s disposal
in reliance upon the safeguards of the trust form.94
90
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Certainly when the trust is used to fulfill “commercial usages, the contractarian character
of the trust is transparent,”95 a conclusion that suggests it may be particularly appropriate to
enforce a mandatory arbitration provision in a commercial trust.96 However, the contractual
theory of trusts can apply in most non-commercial contexts as well, since even if the
contractarian approach is considered “unsuitable for the two-party declaration of trust, . . . such
an observation in no way invalidates the contract approach to the more traditional three-party
trust where the grantor does not act as the trustee.”97
The contract theory of trusts is attractive to proponents of mandatory trust arbitration for
a variety of reasons.98 While these issues will be discussed further below, it is nevertheless
interesting to note that prior to the adoption of the first Restatement of Trusts, U.S. courts appear
to “have had little difficulty upholding testamentary arbitration clauses,” often doing so “by
drawing analogies to contract law.”99 Furthermore, several recent judicial opinions appear to
adopt this approach. For example, in Stender v. Cardwell, a federal district court allowed
arbitration of various claims associated with the breach of a declaration of trust in an UPREIT,
which is a type of REIT.100 Although the analysis was somewhat cursory, the court framed the
action as a breach of contract, rather than a breach of fiduciary duty, thus suggesting more of a
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contractual approach rather than a donative approach.101 Other courts have also upheld
arbitration provisions found in commercial trusts based on contractual rationales. 102
Contract-based analyses also appear in the context of family trusts. Thus, for example,
the court in In re Ismailoff ruled that an arbitration provision found in an irrevocable inter vivos
trust was “enforceable at the election of any one of the four trustees.”103 In re Ismailoff is
particularly interesting because the opinion states that the settlor “executed an agreement with
her four children (trustees) creating an irrevocable inter vivos trust.”104 The reference to “an
agreement” suggests either that the settlor drafted a trust that incorporated certain contractual
elements not normally found in trusts or that the court simply characterized a standard inter vivos
trust being contractual in nature.105 Given the sparseness of the published opinion, it is
impossible to know which situation actually arose. Nevertheless, the decision demonstrates that
judges are willing to view trusts in a contractual light, even if it is unclear whether settlors need
to adopt any special drafting techniques to help achieve that outcome.106
Contract theories do not appear as attractive to English courts or commentators. Indeed,
there are no known advocates of that particular approach to trusts, as a general proposition.
Nevertheless, a settlor of an English trust might be able to create contractual obligations in a trust
if:
a settlor, on behalf of himself and the beneficiaries deriving their interests through
him, expressly contracts in the trust instrument with the trustee, on behalf of itself
and its successors in title, that in consideration of undertaking the office of trustee
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(for the benefit of the settlor, the beneficiaries and itself) any breach of trust claim
against the trustees shall be referred to arbitration.107
Thus, English law may permit parties to overcome certain theoretical difficulties through
careful drafting.108 Furthermore, even though this approach currently seems to be limited to
claims associated with breach of trust, it might be possible to extend the technique to address
other sorts of internal disputes.109 Settlors of U.S. trusts might also be able to use similar
techniques to increase the enforceability of a mandatory trust provision in a trust governed by
U.S. law.
While the contractual theory of trusts is often seen in the United States as being in
conflict with the donative theory, not every country experiences this kind of jurisprudential
tension. Instead, a number of jurisdictions – particularly certain civil law nations that have
adopted their own domestic version of the trust – view trusts through an exclusively contractual
lens, often upholding mandatory arbitration provisions in trusts as a matter of course.110

3.

Other theories of trusts

Although U.S. commentary focuses primarily on the contractual and donative theories of trusts,
several other theories also exist. For example, a court or arbitrator might rely on the intention
theory of trusts, which views “the intention of the settlor as the law of the trust.”111 Though
somewhat similar to the contractual theory of trusts, this approach suggests that “[t]he relative
107
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weight of the rights at issue in a will [or trust] dispute” favor upholding the settlor’s intent vis-àvis arbitration, since the settlor’s “right to dispose of her property as she sees fit is indisputably
superior to the right of an intestate heir or beneficiary under a prior will [or trust] to receive the
testator’s [or settlor’s] property.”112 While any conditions imposed under this theory “have to be
lawful and not contrary to public policy, . . . an arbitration clause, generally speaking, is not
against public policy.”113
Decision-makers might also consider “the benefit approach, which means that the
beneficiaries of a trust ha[ve] to take the whole disposition including conditions and restrictions
imposed by the settlor.”114 Rather than characterizing a conveyance as contractual or donative,
this theory views trusts in a more equitable light, essentially estopping beneficiaries from
accepting some, but not all, of the benefits of a trust. Interestingly, the concept of estoppel is
also available in arbitration law,115 which suggests that this theory might be particularly
appropriate in cases involving mandatory arbitration of trust disputes. Indeed, one U.S. court has
apparently already relied on estoppel to extend the effects of an arbitration provision in an
external contract to include matters internal to the trust.116
Having described various background matters concerning trusts, it is time to consider
issues relating directly to the arbitration of trust disputes. These matters are taken up in the
following section.
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III.

Arbitration of Trust Disputes

A.

Benefits of Arbitration

Arbitration is well-known as offering many benefits to parties. However, it is important to
consider whether and to what extent these positive attributes also extend to trust disputes, since it
would be unwise to adopt a procedure that is ill-suited to the types of claims that are expected to
arise.117 Indeed, specialists in arbitration agree that although arbitration offers significant
advantages over litigation, arbitration may not be appropriate in every dispute.118
First, parties are said to favor arbitration because it is faster and more cost-effective than
litigation.119 This is an equally important issue for settlors and trustees who are increasingly
troubled by the amount of time and money that is spent on hostile trust litigation.120
Controversies involving international trusts may be particularly at risk for increased litigation
costs, since many offshore trusts are located in jurisdictions that give rise to extensive discovery
disputes and lengthy appeals, including appeals to the Privy Council in London.121 Since
arbitration limits the availability of both discovery and judicial appeals, arbitration seems wellsuited to the needs of parties to trust disputes.122
Second, parties often prefer arbitration because it offers a private and confidential means
of resolving legal controversies.123 Interestingly, settlors and trustees may have an even higher
desire for these protections than actors in other fields do. For example, settlors in both the
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testamentary and commercial contexts often adopt the trust form precisely because a trust
provides more privacy than any of the other alternatives.124 One would naturally expect settlors
to want the same degree of confidentiality in their dispute resolution processes. Professional
trustees have also been said to prefer the privacy of arbitration because public forms of dispute
resolution can damage not only the trustees’ own personal reputations but also the reputation of
the trust industry as a whole.125
Although arbitral concepts of privacy and confidentiality may be attractive to parties to
trust disputes, there are some potential problems in this regard. Trust controversies are
considered to proceed in rem, which means that a broad range of actual and potential parties may
seek to join or be joined to the action.126 The possibility of multiparty proceedings could create
potential difficulties with respect to both the provision of notice and the opportunity to
participate in the arbitration. While there are ways of addressing both these issues,127 parties to
trust disputes need to be aware of possible deviations from the common expectation of arbitral
privacy, confidentiality and bilateral proceedings.128
Third, parties in other fields often choose arbitration because of its procedural
flexibility.129 Party autonomy is equally valued in trust cases, since many settlors choose the
trust form precisely because of its structural flexibility. Given that many settlors are already
predisposed toward autonomy, it would be unlikely for them not to want to exercise a similar
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amount of control over the procedures used to resolve any disputes associated with the trusts
they have created.130 Parties to international disputes may be particularly attracted to this aspect
of arbitration, since settlors and beneficiaries are often ill at ease with judicial procedures used in
the countries where offshore trusts are located and would appreciate a dispute resolution process
that provides procedural predictability and familiarity.131
Again, however, potential problems exist. For example, some courts and commentators
have suggested that the lack of procedural formality that is said to typify arbitration132 could lead
to violations of the substantive or procedural rights of the parties to a trust dispute.133 Special
concerns arise with respect to unborn, unascertained or legally incompetent beneficiaries.134
However, these concerns appear largely misplaced, given the wide range of procedural
protections that exist under contemporary rules of arbitration.135 Furthermore, it is always
possible to modify existing arbitral processes to meet the unique needs of parties to trust
disputes.136
Fourth, commercial actors often use arbitration so that they can choose a decision-maker
who holds particular expertise in the subject matter at issue.137 Given that trust law can be quite
specialized as a matter of both procedural and substantive law, settlors would be expected to
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value this particular attribute of arbitration at least as much as parties to other types of disputes
do.138
Interestingly, this may be one area where certain members of the trust bench and bar are
unaware of precisely how beneficial arbitration can be. For example, concerns have occasionally
been raised about the competence of arbitrators vis-à-vis trust disputes, particularly with respect
to whether arbitrators are able to handle the kind of complex, multiparty claims commonly
associated with trusts.139 As it turns out, these criticisms are remarkably similar to those made in
the early days of arbitration, when hostility to anything other than judicial resolution of disputes
was rife.140 Over the years, the arbitral community has created numerous methods of addressing
these types of concerns, which means that it is unlikely that trust arbitration will run into any
difficulties with respect to the competence of arbitrators.141 Instead, parties to trust arbitration
are much more apt to reap the benefits associated with an arbitral regime that has had decades to
grow and mature.
The preceding four points apply equally to both national and international disputes.
However, parties to international disputes have a fifth and final reason to prefer arbitration over
litigation. Enforcement of foreign judgments is a difficult and notoriously unpredictable
undertaking, since it is based primarily on principles of comity.142 Parties to arbitration have a
much easier time enforcing foreign arbitral awards because the process is almost exclusively
governed by various multilateral treaties, the most prominent of which is the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
138
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Convention).143 These international conventions reflect a strong bias in favor of enforcement of
arbitration agreements and awards, which allows parties to an international trust arbitration to
obtain final resolution of their disputes much more quickly, efficiently, predictably and costeffectively than parties to an international trust litigation can.144 Both the United States and
England are parties to the New York Convention, as are many of the more popular jurisdictions
for offshore trusts (including Jersey, Guernsey, Bermuda, the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands),
either as independent contracting states or as territories of a contracting state.145
However, some potential problems again arise. Parties hoping to benefit from the New
York Convention’s pro-enforcement regime must first ensure that the dispute in question is
covered by the Convention.146 Claims regarding the internal operations of a trust might
experience some difficulties in this regard if a particular jurisdiction does not consider trust
disputes to be (1) commercial in nature or (2) capable of settlement by arbitration.147
The first issue, commerciality, is disposed of relatively easily, since most, if not all, trusts
can be considered “commercial” as a matter of arbitration law.148 Commercial trusts obviously
pass muster, since they are expressly created for business purposes.149 However, most noncommercial trusts would likely fall within the prescribed definitions as well, since many
jurisdictions’ definitions of commercial activity are so broad as to cover almost any transaction
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involving money.150 Therefore, parties should be aware of this requirement but should not be
unduly concerned by it.
The second concern – namely whether a trust dispute is capable of settlement by
arbitration – is much more complicated. The issue here relates to the concept of arbitrability,
which considers which disputes can be heard in arbitration and which are reserved to the
exclusive purview of the courts.151 This concept is central to the debate about mandatory trust
arbitration and is discussed in detail below.152
Despite several areas of potential concern, arbitration appears to be as attractive to parties
to trust disputes as to parties in other areas of law. As a result, it is not surprising that many
settlors favor mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes.153 However, several problems arise
in this regard. First among these is the fact that trustees appear to have more power to initiate
arbitration than settlors do under existing law. This issue is discussed in the next subsection.

B.

Trustees’ Powers to Arbitrate

Although the contemporary debate about mandatory arbitration of trust disputes sometimes
makes the process sound as if it is a recent innovation, arbitration of trust disputes has long been
permitted in both England and the United States, frequently as a result of statutes that either
implicitly or explicitly permit the trustee to enter into arbitration agreements with respect to
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matters external to the trust.154 While arbitration agreements with external third parties have
sometimes led to the arbitration of internal trust disputes,155 at this point the paradigm for trustrelated arbitration involves a matter arising out of a bilateral commercial relationship between
the trust and some external third party such as an agent or advisor.
Although detailed consideration of external trust disputes is beyond the scope of this
Article, there are two reasons why it is necessary to undertake a brief discussion of statutes
commonly used to allow the trustee to arbitrate with third parties. First, some of this legislation
is ambiguous as to whether it refers only to arbitrations initiated by trustees or whether it applies
equally to arbitrations mandated by the trust agreement itself.156 Since some courts could
interpret the statutes as providing a basis for mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes, it is
useful to at least introduce the various provisions.
Second, this type of legislation suggests the possible scope of issues that might be
amenable to arbitration arising out of arbitral clauses found in trust instruments. This conclusion
is based on the fact that legal issues that are subject to arbitration in one context cannot be said to
be inherently non-arbitrable in another.157 Therefore, courts considering the enforceability of
154
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arbitration provisions found in trusts may be able to rely on these statutes to help determine
whether certain issues are arbitrable.158
A few examples should be sufficient to demonstrate the range of legislation that is
currently in force. One approach, found in the Uniform Trust Code (UTC),159 simply indicates
that “interested persons may enter into a binding nonjudicial settlement agreement with respect
to any matter involving a trust.”160 Although such agreements are “encouraged,” they are “valid
only to the extent that [they do] not violate a material purpose of the trust and include[ ] terms
and conditions that could be properly approved by the court under this [Code] or other applicable
law.”161
The range of arbitrable issues described under the UTC is quite broad and includes:
(1) the interpretation or construction of the terms of the trust;
(2) the approval of a trustee’s report or accounting;
(3) direction to a trustee to refrain from performing a particular act or the grant to
a trustee of any necessary or desirable power;
(4) the resignation or appointment of a trustee and the determination of a trustee’s
compensation;
(5) transfer of a trust’s principal place of administration; and
(6) liability of a trustee for an action relating to the trust.162
Notably, a number of these items relate to internal matters of trust construction and
administration. As such, the UTC extends the concept of arbitrability of trust disputes from
straightforward contract matters involving external third parties to those involving key issues of
substantive trust law.
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However, the UTC fails to address some important concerns. For example, drafters were
purposefully vague when it came to describing how these sort of nonjudicial agreements could
arise.163 Because the term “interested persons” is defined as meaning “persons whose consent
would be required in order to achieve a binding settlement were the settlement to be approved by
the court,”164 the UTC provides no guidance as to whether the settlor can require mandatory
arbitration through inclusion of an arbitration provision in the trust.165
Other sections of the UTC are equally unhelpful in this regard. For example, the UTC
appears to reserve certain activities to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court, which could be
taken to mean that arbitration of these matters is prohibited.166 However, there is more than one
way to read exclusive jurisdiction clauses when considering questions of arbitrability.167
Furthermore, the commentary published with the UTC explicitly states that “[s]ettlors wishing to
encourage use of alternate dispute resolution may draft to provide it” and refers interested parties
to the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules for sample language.168 This of course suggests
that mandatory arbitration is possible under the UTC, at least with respect to some issues.
Although the UTC is not perfect, it nevertheless constitutes a significant step forward
with regard to the arbitration of trust disputes. However, some individual U.S. states go even
further. For example, the states of Washington and Idaho have enacted statutory provisions
indicating that:
163
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[t]he “matters” that may be addressed and resolved through a nonjudicial
procedure are broadly defined and include any issue, question, or dispute
involving: (i) the determination of any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs,
next of kin, or other persons interested in an estate, trust, nonprobate asset, or with
respect to any other asset or property interest passing at death; (ii) the direction of
a personal representative or trustee to do or to abstain from doing any act in a
fiduciary capacity; (iii) the determination of any question arising in the
administration of an estate or trust or with respect to any nonprobate assets or any
other asset or property interest passing at death, including, without limitation,
questions relating to the construction of wills, trusts, community property
agreements, or other writings, a change of personal representative or trustee, a
change of the situs of a trust, an accounting from a personal representative or
trustee, or the determination of fees for a personal representative or trustee; (iv) the
grant to a personal representative or trustee of any necessary or desirable power
not otherwise granted in the governing instrument or given by law; and (v) the
amendment, reformation, or conformation of a will or trust instrument to comply
with statutes and regulations of the Internal Revenue Code in order to achieve
qualification for deductions, elections, and other tax requirements.169
This language is obviously quite expansive. However, the Washington and Idaho statutes
suffer from the same problem as the UTC, namely ambiguity with respect to who may invoke
these provisions.170
English law takes a somewhat different approach to nonjudicial settlement of trust
disputes. While most U.S. statutes focus on the type of claims that may be settled by arbitration
– thus leaving open the question of whether the arbitration agreement in question may be made
only by the trustee after the creation of the trust or whether the settlor can include enforceable
arbitration provisions in the trust itself – English law explicitly states that powers relating to
nonjudicial dispute resolution are limited to the trustee. Thus, the Trustee Act 1925 states that
trustees may:
compromise, compound, abandon, submit to arbitration, or otherwise settle any
debt, account, claim, or thing whatever relating to the testator’s or intestate’s
estate or to the trust;
169
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and for any of those purposes may enter into, give, execute, and do such
agreements, instruments of composition or arrangement, releases, and other things
as to [the trustee or trustees] seem expedient, without being responsible for any
loss occasioned by any act or thing so done by him or them if he has or they have
discharged the duty of care set out in section 1(1) of the Trustee Act 2000.171
Although the English statute is limited as to who may authorize the arbitration, the
language is quite broad with respect to the types of claims that can be made in arbitration (“any
debt, account, claim, or thing whatever relating to . . . the trust”).172 This suggests that most, if
not all, trust-related issues are inherently arbitrable in England, a position that may be very
useful if English courts come to recognize that settlors have the power to require arbitration of
disputes relating to trusts.173
One question that arises with respect to provisions that explicitly or implicitly authorize
only the trustee to initiate arbitration is whether the trustee’s discretion in that regard can or
should be influenced by an express direction in the trust indicating that the trustee must seek to
arbitrate any and all disputes arising out of or in connection with the trust.174 As it currently
stands, statutes regarding nonjudicial settlement procedures do not seem to include any
requirement that the trustee be acting at the settlor’s direction, although a trustee would of course
have to follow an explicit instruction from the settlor in this regard if such a requirement were
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included in the trust.175 Thus, whether a particular trust dispute is made subject to arbitration
currently appears to be largely a matter of discretion on the part of the trustee. This appears
somewhat anomalous, since it means that trustees have more power to initiate arbitration than
settlors do. While this approach may be consistent with what is often a significant grant of
discretion given to trustees under most trusts and as a matter of trust law,176 it appears somewhat
out of step with the fundamental concept that trusts are to be interpreted so as to effectuate the
desires of the settlor.177

C.

Settlors’ Powers to Compel Mandatory Trust Arbitration
1.

Legislation in Favor of Mandatory Trust Arbitration

These sorts of limitations on settlor autonomy have led a number of jurisdictions to enact
legislation explicitly recognizing the enforceability of a mandatory arbitration provision located
in the trust instrument itself. For example, in 2008, Arizona passed a law stating that “[a] trust
instrument may provide mandatory, exclusive and reasonable procedures to resolve issues
between the trustee and interested persons or among interested persons with regard to the
administration or distribution of the trust.”178 This enactment, which was promulgated in
response to the decision in Schoneberger v. Oelze denying the enforceability of an arbitration
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clause found in a trust,179 is to be construed broadly to include “any matter involving the trust’s
administration, including a request for instructions and an action to declare rights.”180
Florida has also made statutory provision for the arbitration of many, though not all,
types of trust disputes. That enactment, passed in 2007, indicates that:
(1) A provision in a will or trust requiring the arbitration of disputes, other
than disputes of the validity of all or a part of a will or trust, between or
among the beneficiaries and a fiduciary under the will or trust, or any
combination of such persons or entities, is enforceable.
(2) Unless otherwise specified in the will or trust, a will or trust provision
requiring arbitration shall be presumed to require binding arbitration under s.
44.104.181
Legislative reforms have also taken place outside the United States.182 For example,
Guernsey, one of the leading jurisdictions for offshore trusts, enacted a statute in 2007 discussing
the resolution of certain actions by alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration. 183 That
law states that:
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(1)

Where (a) the terms of a trust direct or authorise, or the Court so orders, that
any claim against a trustee founded on breach of trust may be referred to
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”),
(b) such a claim arises and, in accordance with the terms of the trust or
the Court’s order, is referred to ADR, and
(c) the ADR results in a settlement of the claim which is recorded in a
document signed by or on behalf of all parties,
the settlement is binding on all beneficiaries of the trust, whether or not
yet ascertained or in existence, and whether or not minors or persons
under legal disability.

(2)

Subsection (1) applies in respect of a beneficiary only if (a) he was represented in the ADR proceedings (whether personally, or
by his guardian, or as the member of a class, or otherwise), or
(b) if not so represented, he had notice of the ADR proceedings and a
reasonable opportunity of being heard,
and only if, in the case of a beneficiary who is not yet ascertained or in
existence, or who is a minor or person under legal disability, the person
conducting the ADR proceedings certifies that he was independently
represented by a person appointed for the purpose by a court of law.
“Notice” in paragraph (b) means 14 days’ notice or such other period as
the person conducting the ADR proceedings may direct.

(3) A person who represents a beneficiary in the ADR proceedings for the
purposes of subsection (2)(a) is under a duty of care to the beneficiary.
(4)
For the avoidance of doubt, the ADR proceedings need not be conducted
in Guernsey or in accordance with the procedural law of Guernsey.
(5)

In this section “ADR” includes conciliation, mediation, early neutral
evaluation, adjudication, expert determination and arbitration, and
“proceedings” includes oral and written proceedings.184
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Although the statute relates only to a limited range of claims (i.e., claims brought against
a trustee for breach of trust), it specifically contemplates the possibility that the arbitration can be
mandated through a provision included in the trust instrument itself.185 The statute, which has
extraterritorial application, also expressly indicates that beneficiaries of the trust may be bound
by the outcome of the arbitration.186 Similar reforms may soon follow in other offshore
jurisdictions as various nations seek to obtain a competitive advantage in the battle for trustrelated business.187 Indeed, the Bahamas are currently in the process of enacting legislation that
is even broader than that currently in place in Guernsey.188

2.

Elements Required for Mandatory Trust Arbitration Under Common Law
Principles

As useful as these types of statutes are, they are still relatively rare, at least in common law
jurisdictions. Most legislation relating to the arbitration of trust disputes is either ambiguous as
to who has the ability to initiate arbitration or gives that power only to the trustee.189 Courts are
therefore left with little guidance on how to address matters relating to mandatory trust
arbitration.
Fortunately, commentators have been busy in this area of law, providing numerous
critiques of the various issues. Much of the analysis comes from outside the United States and
thus has yet to be considered in the context of U.S. law.
The literature tends to follow a relatively standard framework and considers whether:
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(1) the court’s jurisdiction is being ousted in an unacceptable fashion;
(2) the clause purporting to be an arbitration clause is an agreement that is both
(a) operable, effective and capable of being performed and (b) covers the dispute
at issue;
(3) the clause is binding on the party seeking to avoid arbitration;
(4) all interested parties, including unascertained, unborn and legally incompetent
beneficiaries, are properly represented in the proceeding; and
(5) the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable.190
These five factors overlap to a considerable extent,191 so it is impossible to conduct a rigorously
segregated assessment of each separate element. Nevertheless, it is useful to track the standard
form of analysis so as to better understand the various challenges to mandatory arbitration from a
trust law perspective. Furthermore, by following the pre-established structure, it is possible to
consider new ways that arbitration law might contribute to the debate about the propriety of
mandatory trust arbitration. Therefore, each of the five factors will be introduced separately
below.

a.

No impermissible ouster of the court’s jurisdiction

Courts have traditionally exercised uniquely broad powers over the administration of trusts,192
making concerns about the possible ouster of judicial jurisdiction particularly pressing. Indeed,
many non-specialists may be surprised to learn about the extent of the courts’ control over trustrelated issues. For example, it has been said that:
[t]rust procedure law may described as a three-tier structure. The routine phase is
periodic judicial accounting. The accounting informs the beneficiaries, enabling
them to enforce their rights. The accounting also provides closure for trustees on
current installments of these long-duration undertakings. Because, however,
judicial accountings can be costly and clumsy, drafters sometimes prefer to alter
the default regime in favor of nonjudicial accountings.
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The second procedural level, for situations of uncertainty or dispute, is judicial
instruction. The trust tradition has been precocious in allowing the parties,
typically the trustee, early resort to authoritative judicial guidance.
Finally, if litigation arises, it is tried to the judge, sitting without a jury. 193
Most, if not all, of the existing analysis regarding mandatory arbitration of trust disputes
has focused on the third type of dispute, which is of course most analogous to arbitration.
However, significant and somewhat different questions arise with respect to the arbitration of
accounting and instruction procedures. The following discussion therefore begins with an
analysis of arbitration as a litigation substitute, since some of the issues raised in that context are
equally applicable to matters raised with respect to the other two types of trust procedures. The
text then goes on to address special concerns relating to judicial accounting and instruction.

i.

Arbitration as a litigation substitute

In order to determine whether arbitration impermissibly ousts the jurisdiction of the court, it is
necessary to understand the basis for the courts’ extensive powers over trust-related matters.
Several possible rationales exist. One stems from a concern that allowing the dispute to be
resolved through any other means could disadvantage one or more of the parties, typically
through the non-application of a mandatory provision of law.194 However, an evaluation of the
principles motivating mandatory rules of trust law suggests that none of these rules would be
offended by arbitration. This is because:
[a]part from the anti-dead-hand rules, the mandatory rules of trust law have a
prevailingly intent-serving purpose. They facilitate rather than prohibit; their
policy is cautionary and protective. These rules force the settlor to be precise
about the tradeoffs between benefiting the trustee and benefiting the beneficiary;
hence they aim to clarify and channel, rather than to defeat the settlor’s intent.
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Trust terms that would excuse bad faith, or dispense with fiduciary obligation, or
conceal the trust from its beneficiaries would make the trust obligation illusory,
effectively allowing the trustee to loot the trust. . . . The intent-serving mandatory
rules merely require a settlor who has such an improbable intent to articulate it
unambiguously, in order to prevent the settlor from stumbling into that result
through misunderstanding or imposition. Accordingly, apart from the anti-deadhand rules, the mandatory rules of trust law have only the modest aspiration of
truth in labeling.195
Anti-dead-hand rules can be set aside as having little, if anything, to do with arbitration,
since they typically focus on (1) issues relating to future interests, as reflected in the Rule
Against Perpetuities and similar provisions that give effect to the desire to promote the
alienability of land, and (2) the principle that the trust must benefit the beneficiaries.196 Rules
requiring the settlor to indicate clearly his or her intentions regarding the relationship between
the trustee and the beneficiaries are also not hindered by arbitration, not only because arbitration
does not affect the balance of power between parties (instead providing only an alternative
means of dispute resolution) but also because arbitration clauses already need to be clear to be
enforceable as a matter of arbitration law.197 Therefore, an arbitration provision that clearly
reflects the settlor’s desires would not appear to oust the jurisdiction of the court in any
impermissible manner vis-à-vis the various mandatory rules of law. Instead, arbitration would
actually effectuate the intent of the settlor in accordance with the central aim of trust law, which
holds that courts are meant to give effect to the intent of testators and settlors unless doing so
would contravene positive law or public policy.198
Another rationale relating to the broad jurisdictional powers of the courts focuses on the
idea that access to the courts is necessary as a means of helping protect the beneficiaries from
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overreaching from the trustee. Thus, for example, it is usually “a non-excludable feature of a
trust that the trustee’s administration of the fund must be, directly or indirectly, subject to the
supervision of the court.”199
When considering the scope and corpus of the trustee’s accountability, trust law often
speaks of the “irreducible core” duties of a trustee.200 Core duties typically cannot be delegated
to another person without express authorization in the trust instrument,201 which means that
courts and commentators must consider whether mandatory arbitration of trust disputes
impermissibly infringes on the trustee’s rights and responsibilities.202
Notably, commentators have concluded that:
there is nothing in the concept of the irreducible core that necessarily precludes
compulsory arbitration. The principle is that the trustee must be sufficiently
accountable so that his status as the non-beneficial owner of the assets vested in
him is practically real. Seen solely from the point of the irreducible core concept,
effective accountability does not mean that the trustees can be accountable only to
the court rather than to some other body which has power to enquire into the
trustees’ administration of the fund and to require them to abide by the terms of
the trust instrument.203
Furthermore, objections from the beneficiaries “would only have weight if the
beneficiaries were denied any effective means of enforcing their interests against the trustees. If
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the ADR procedure had effective machinery for enforcing the outcome of the determination
against the trustees, then it seems that this objection would not hold.”204
Issues relating to the impermissible ouster of the courts could also appear to stem from
concerns about overreaching on the part of the settlor.205 For example, it is said that settlors
“cannot deprive the beneficiary of his right to apply to the court about the proper administration
of the trust, or for directions about the construction of the trustee’s powers and how they should
be exercised.”206 However, concerns about overreaching by the settlor appear to be more
properly addressed as an arbitrability issue rather than a concern about the ouster of the court’s
jurisdiction and are therefore discussed below.207
When considering the concept of the irreducible core, courts not only look at whether
“there remains a sufficient inner core of duties owed to the beneficiaries to enable a trust to
subsist,” they also consider whether there is anything about the trust that impermissibly ousts
“the jurisdiction of the court to determine matters of law.”208 There are several ways to consider
this issue. One focuses on whether the matter in question falls under a provision in the trust or
probate code that appears to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the courts. This type of concern goes
to the question of arbitrability and is discussed below.209
Another way to analyze this type of issue would be to look at the governing arbitration
law to determine whether and to what extent it permits questions of law to be decided in
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arbitration.210 For example, the English Arbitration Act 1996 states that parties can appeal an
arbitral award on a question of law.211 However, parties may expressly contract out of this
particular provision, thus prohibiting judicial appeal on questions of law.212 Experts in English
trust law have suggested that this aspect of the Arbitration Act 1996 acts as a permissible ouster
of the jurisdiction of the court on matters of trust law.213
Other national and international laws clearly prohibit courts from reviewing questions of
law that have been decided by an arbitral tribunal in any circumstances.214 Thus, for example,
parties to an international dispute may not object to enforcement of a foreign arbitral award
under the New York Convention on the grounds that the arbitrators misapplied or ignored the
law.215 A similar result arises in countries that have based their national arbitration statutes on
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (Model Arbitration Law).216
Interestingly, the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is silent on whether parties may
appeal an arbitral award on a question of law.217 Although most courts and commentators take
the view that judicial appeals on points of law violate the principle of arbitral finality,218 some
U.S. judges have been known to vacate an arbitral award if the arbitral tribunal was believed to

210

See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 9, ¶¶11.1, 11.79.
See Arbitration Act 1996, supra note 75, §69; see also BORN, supra note 5, at 2646-47; BRUCE HARRIS ET AL.,
THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996: A COMMENTARY 332-42 (2003).
212
See Arbitration Act 1996, supra note 75, §69.
213
See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 9, ¶¶11.1, 11.79; see also Arbitration Act 1996, supra note 75, §69.
214
See BORN, supra note 5, at 2638-55, 2865-70.
215
See New York Convention, supra note 143, art. V.
216
See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, UNCITRAL, 18th Sess., Annex 1, U.N.
Doc. A/40/17 (June 21, 1985), revised by Revised Articles of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, UNCITRAL, 39th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/61/17 (July 7, 2006), art. 34 [hereinafter
Model Arbitration Law]; BORN, supra note 5, at 638-55, 2562-64, 2865-69.
217
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307; see also BORN, supra note 5, at 2639-46. Very few U.S. state statutes address this issue,
either. See LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §§39:13, 39:16 (2011).
218
See BORN, supra note 5, at 64-65.
211

45

have decided the issue in manifest disregard of the law.219 This creates an interesting situation
for mandatory trust arbitration, since the doctrine of manifest disregard could be seen as
providing a judicial escape valve that would overcome any concerns about arbitration
impermissibly ousting the court’s jurisdiction over trust-related matters.
However, the analysis does not end there. In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court questioned
the continued viability of the doctrine of manifest disregard in Hall Street Associates, LLC v.
Mattel, Inc., only to suggest two years later in Stolt-Nielsen, SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. that
the doctrine may still survive.220 This has created some confusion in the arbitral community,
although it has resulted in few practical problems, since the doctrine of manifest disregard has
always been very narrowly drawn and has been successful only on very rare occasions.221
However, judicial foreclosure of manifest disregard of law as a means of overturning
arbitral awards does not create any special problems for mandatory trust arbitration. Instead, the
decision to eliminate that grounds of review simply demonstrates a policy choice in favor of
arbitral finality, similar to that taken in other jurisdictions that hold that the parties to arbitration
may agree to forego the right to judicial appeal of the merits of a dispute.222 Since there is no
reason to believe that U.S. courts would, could or should take a view of arbitral finality in trust
disputes that is different than that taken in any other kind of dispute, the elimination of the
doctrine of manifest disregard as a matter of U.S. arbitral law should not affect the development
of mandatory trust arbitration in any way.
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Even though arbitration law typically forbids courts from reviewing the substance of an
arbitral award, courts may nevertheless review an arbitral award for procedural improprieties
relating to the arbitral process.223 Although these grounds are described as “limited,” they cover
many important procedural rights and give courts the ultimate authority over the enforcement of
an arbitral award.224
Interestingly, arbitration’s longstanding emphasis on procedural rather than substantive
review should not create any problems for mandatory trust arbitration because most, if not all, of
the trust community’s concerns about the impermissible ouster of the courts appear to be based
on the need to ensure procedural fairness.225 These reservations can be addressed in one of two
ways: either the procedure in question must ensure that the trustee is accountable to some
neutral external agent226 or the settlor must demonstrate that he or she took adequate care in
setting up alternative dispute resolution procedures in the trust instrument.227 Critically, neither
of these processes is undermined by arbitration, given the availability of judicial review of
arbitral proceedings after the conclusion of the arbitration.228 For these reasons, commentators
have concluded that arbitration agreements do not oust the jurisdiction of the court in an
impermissible manner but instead “merely postpone the involvement of the court until after an
arbitration has been carried out.”229
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ii.

Special issues regarding judicial accounting and instruction

The preceding discussion focused on whether arbitration constitutes an impermissible ouster of
the courts at the final stage of a dispute. However, judicial jurisdiction over trusts also
encompasses two other procedures: “periodic judicial accounting,” which “informs the
beneficiaries, enabling them to enforce their rights” and “provides closure for trustees on current
installments of these long-duration undertakings,” as well as “judicial instruction,” which gives
“the parties, typically the trustee, early resort to authoritative judicial guidance” in “situations of
uncertainty or dispute.”230 Neither of these two matters has been specifically discussed in the
legal literature on mandatory trust arbitration, and the courts appear split on how to address such
matters. For example, one court invalidated an arbitration provision found in a side agreement
with an external third party advisor on the grounds that arbitration would “unacceptably divest
the court of continuing jurisdiction in this matter”231 while another court upheld arbitration in
somewhat similar circumstances but retained the power to hear questions of interpretation of the
contract under a split jurisdiction clause.232
The first procedure – judicial accounting – could give rise to difficulties because it may
contemplate a continuing supervisory role for the adjudicator and arbitration does not typically
provide long-term oversight of ongoing relationships.233 Instead, arbitration is used to resolve
discrete disputes. However, the same can be said of courts: in most instances, courts do not
provide continuing oversight of private relationships but instead adjudicate individual cases or
controversies. Trust law constitutes a limited exception to this general rule, allowing courts in
230
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some jurisdictions to provide oversight to trusts on a continuing basis.234 In other jurisdictions,
beneficiaries may apply to the court for an order requiring the trustee to provide an
accounting.235
At first, these procedures might appear problematic for arbitration. However, possible
solutions exist within the existing arbitral regime. For example, some fields – most prominently,
the construction industry – use dispute review boards (also known as dispute resolution boards)
to resolve issues that may arise between parties to a long-term contract.236 Members of the
review board are appointed at the beginning of the parties’ contractual relationship and continue
in that capacity for the duration of the contract, allowing panelists to gain an ongoing familiarity
with the parties and the nature of their relationship while also providing a quick and costefficient means of resolving small disputes before they escalate into something more serious.
Although some dispute review boards only operate in an advisory capacity, other panels render
binding decisions.237
Trusts often reflect the same kind of relational characteristic seen in long-term
commercial contracts,238 and a similar type of standing dispute resolution mechanism could be
used in the trust context to deal with ongoing issues such as judicial accounting. Because the
members of the board would be either appointed by a neutral body (such as an arbitral
institution) or by both proponents of the trust or accounting procedure (i.e., the trustee) and those
whose interests would be expected to be adverse to the trust or the accounting procedure (i.e., the
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beneficiaries), such a process would comply with contemporary requirements for procedural
fairness and would allow the trustee to be held accountable to the beneficiaries.239
The second procedure – judicial instruction – runs into potential difficulties because
arbitration typically does not involve the granting of advisory opinions.240 However, several
possible solutions again arise under existing arbitration law. For example, some countries, most
notably England, allow courts to make determinations on preliminary points of law without
robbing the arbitral tribunal of its jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute.241 Alternatively,
courts could view requests for judicial instruction as akin to requests for declarative or injunctive
relief. This latter option would be very useful, since numerous countries allow arbitrators to
render awards providing for these kinds of remedies.242
Some concerns could arise relating to the fact that parties could seek instructions from the
arbitral tribunal on numerous occasions. However, there is no requirement that arbitration only
be used only once by a particular set of parties. Instead, certain long-term contracts may give
rise to a number of different arbitral proceedings over the course of the parties’ relationship.
Decisions may be rendered by the same tribunal (under the auspices of a standing dispute review
board or through the reappointment of the same arbitrators that heard the first matter) or by a
series of different tribunals.243 However, in either case, arbitrators must take care to ensure that
an award constitutes final resolution of either the entire issue or of a particular matter that can be
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severed from other outstanding issues so that the award will be considered immediately
enforceable.244
Another possibility is that requests for judicial instruction could be framed as requests for
interim or provisional relief. Again, most jurisdictions allow arbitrators to render awards
providing for this type of remedy.245 Framing requests for judicial instruction in this light could
lead to an interesting analytical quirk. Arbitration law has traditionally considered courts and
arbitral tribunals to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over requests for interim or provisional
relief.246 Although requests are supposed to go to the arbitral tribunal whenever possible, the
arbitral community decided that courts should retain the ability to hear these matters so as to
avoid hardship to the parties in cases where the tribunal has not yet been appointed or the request
for relief exceeds the powers of the tribunal, as in cases where an order has to be directed to a
third party.247 If requests for judicial instruction are considered to be a type of provisional or
interim relief, judges would still be able to hear certain urgent matters if it were necessary to do
so.248 Since jurisdiction is concurrent, arbitration cannot oust the jurisdiction of the court.
Taken together, these observations suggest that arbitration does not result in any
impermissible ouster of judicial jurisdiction with respect to accounting or instruction procedures.
This conclusion is bolstered by Roehl v. Ritchie, a 2007 decision from the California Court of
Appeal that involved the arbitration of an accounting procedure.249 The arbitrator there had
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rendered a series of awards pursuant to an arbitration provision contained in a family trust, with
the precise issue at bar being whether and to what extent the arbitrator was able to amend or
correct a prior award in a subsequent award.250
In answering that question, the court demonstrated no conceptual difficulty with allowing
an arbitrator to address a series of ongoing accounting issues involving a trust.251 To the
contrary, the court noted that “the utilization of a multiple incremental or successive award
process as a means, in an appropriate case, of finally deciding all submitted issues” was entirely
proper.252 Furthermore, the court noted that:
“the ongoing and changing nature of trust administration” may require ongoing
proceedings “for instructions, to settle accounts, to fix compensation . . . [and] to
allow, compromise or settle claims.” The arbitrator did not abuse his discretion in
fashioning a remedy to resolve ongoing matters relating to Trust administration
costs and fees.253
This conclusion appears appropriate. If provisions regarding judicial oversight of trust
disputes are primarily intended to “make the trustees realistically accountable for the
administration of the trust and the beneficiaries’ interest practically enforceable,”254 then
arbitration is as capable of fulfilling that function in controversies involving judicial accounting
or instruction as it is in matters that resemble litigation. The parties’ access to justice is
adequately protected,255 and courts retain the ultimate ability to review arbitral awards for
violations of the parties’ procedural rights.256 Therefore, arbitration does not appear to
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unacceptably oust the court’s jurisdiction for any of the three types of judicial procedures that
can arise with respect to trusts.

b.

An arbitration clause that is operable, effective and capable of
performance

The second issue to consider involves the arbitration provision itself. For a mandatory
arbitration clause found in a trust to be enforceable, “the clause purporting to be an arbitration
clause . . . [must be] an agreement which is not inoperable, ineffective or incapable of being
performed.”257 Furthermore, there must “actually [be] a dispute within the scope of the
clause.”258
The second of these two requirements is easily disposed of. Issues regarding the scope of
an arbitration agreement have long been decided by arbitrators pursuant to the doctrine of
competence-competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz), which describes the ability of an arbitral
tribunal to decide its own jurisdiction.259 As a result, allowing arbitral tribunals to determine
whether a particular dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration provision found in a trust
does not seem problematic in any way.
The first of these two requirements – i.e., the need to establish that the arbitration clause
that appears in the trust is operable, effective and capable of being performed – gives rise to
much more significant concerns. Most courts and commentators consider these issues solely
from the perspective of national law. However, recent developments in international arbitration
suggest some new solutions to some of the more intransigent problems in this area. The
following discussion considers the relevant concerns under both national and international law,
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although it should be noted that some of the innovations in the international realm affect
domestic disputes as well.

i.

Solutions suggested under national law

Because arbitration is considered “a creature of contract,”260 many jurisdictions require an
arbitration agreement to reflect certain contractual qualities.261 Therefore, if the language
invoking arbitration is located within a larger document, as would be the case with mandatory
arbitration provisions in trusts, then that larger document must typically meet the formal
requirements for a contract.262
Trusts run into two difficulties in this regard. First, trusts are typically only signed by the
settlor, not by other parties.263 Second, trusts do not involve the exchange of consideration,
which is problematic in jurisdictions that hold that “[a]rbitration rests on an exchange of
promises.”264 Although the signature and consideration requirements have proven fatal to
mandatory arbitration of trusts on occasion,265 courts and commentators have identified a number
of ways to overcome both problems. However, the approach varies according to the party’s
relationship to the trust.
The situation is easiest with respect to trustees, since settlors can create explicit
contractual relationships with the trustee, either through language in the trust itself or in a side
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agreement, and can require the trustee to sign the document in question.266 Problems regarding
consideration are typically overcome in one of three ways: either (1) the trustee is paid for his or
her efforts (indeed, it is rare for a trustee to act gratuitously these days);267 (2) the trustee is said
to have consented to the terms of the trust, including any rights and responsibilities thereunder,
by accepting the trust appointment;268 or (3) the jurisdiction in question has concluded that there
is no need for mutual consideration to establish an agreement to arbitrate in the context of a
trust.269
Disputes involving beneficiaries are more difficult. While judicial or legislative
elimination of the need for mutual consideration is equally useful in these types of cases, it is
more difficult for a settlor to draft the trust instrument in such a way that the requirements of a
traditional contractual relationship are met with respect to beneficiaries, since beneficiaries
neither sign the trust instrument nor accept any burdens thereunder. However:
a trust deed could be drafted in such a way that benefiting from the trust would be
deemed an agreement to submit trust disputes to arbitration. By accepting the
gifts or invoking any rights under the trust deed, the beneficiaries would be
deemed to agree to settle any dispute in accordance with the arbitration agreement
contained in the trust deed.270
This technique is known in England as “deemed acquiescence,” whereby beneficiaries
who receive some sort of benefit under the trust are considered bound by the terms of the
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instrument, including any mandatory arbitration clause contained therein.271 Under this doctrine,
“any beneficiary (even an unborn or unascertained one) who derives his entire interest in the
trust from the settlor, and whose rights and obligations under the trust are hence determined by
the trust deed, is deemed to acquiesce to the arbitration provision.”272
The United States has adopted a similar approach under a theory known as “conditional
transfer.”273 Under this doctrine, provisions found in the trust are binding on beneficiaries to the
extent that the beneficiary’s “rights” in the corpus of the trust are seen as “wholly derivative” of
the settlor’s “right to pass her property to the persons of her choosing.”274 Because the
beneficiary has “rights” in the trust only because the settlor granted those rights, the settlor may
condition receipt of any benefits on compliance with arbitration provisions contained in the
trust.275
These theories are not limited to the United States and England. Courts in civil law
countries such as Switzerland have used similar techniques to bind beneficiaries to arbitration
provisions found in the trust instrument.276
As useful as deemed acquiescence and conditional transfer are, they do not eliminate all
concerns relating to the operability and effectiveness of an arbitration provision found in a trust.
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Because these doctrines are derived from the settlor’s consent to arbitration, difficulties can arise
in situations where the settlor’s consent to the trust and therefore to arbitration is in doubt (i.e., in
cases that challenge or deny the existence of the trust altogether).277 This issue is discussed
below.278
Interestingly, deemed acquiescence and conditional transfer resemble certain theories
used in arbitration law to consider whether the benefit or burden of an arbitration agreement can
or should be extended to various non-signatories. Arbitration law allows courts and arbitrators to
extend an arbitration agreement to non-signatories in cases involving “agency (actual and
apparent), alter ego, implied consent, ‘group of companies,’ estoppel, third-party beneficiary,
guarantor, subrogation, legal succession and ratification of assumption.”279 Deemed
acquiescence and conditional transfer could easily be analogized to implied consent, estoppel or
third-party beneficiaries in the arbitral context. Legal succession and ratification might also
apply in cases involving a successor trustee or protector. While this analysis suggests a useful
overlap between trust law and arbitration law, caution should nevertheless be exercised, since
U.S. courts appear somewhat split as to the application of arbitral principles regarding nonsignatories in the context of a trust dispute.280

ii.

Solutions suggested under international law

Although the techniques suggested above may be sufficient to eliminate concerns about the
effectiveness and validity of an arbitration provision arising in a trust, certain international
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developments relating to form requirements in arbitration shed additional light on these issues.
Form requirements in arbitration exist as a matter of both national and international law, and
serve two different purposes.
First, some form requirements are relevant to the validity of an arbitration
agreement: if these requirements are not satisfied, then the agreement to arbitrate
is invalid. Second, other “form requirements” are in reality jurisdictional
conditions which must be satisfied in order for a particular legislative instrument .
. . to apply.281
Both of these types of requirements must be considered in cases involving mandatory trust
arbitration.
The analysis begins at the international level. According to the New York Convention:
[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the
parties undertake to subject to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen
or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration.282
That provision goes on to indicate that “[t]he term ‘agreement in writing’ shall include an arbitral
clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an
exchange of letters or telegrams.”283
If a trust is a contract, then the requirements of the New York Convention are obviously
met by an arbitration provision found in the trust.284 However, the New York Convention does
not define what “a contract” is, which means the issue will be determined by reference to
domestic law. This is of course problematic, given the uncertainty regarding the contractual
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nature of trusts.285 Debate also exists as to whether the New York Convention requires a
contract containing an arbitration provision to be signed by the parties in question.286
Although the New York Convention’s definition of “an agreement in writing” appears
clear on its face, certain problems have arisen in practice.287 For example:
[i]t has been repeatedly pointed out by practitioners that there are a number of
situations where the parties have agreed to arbitrate (and there is evidence in
writing about the agreement), but where, nevertheless, the validity of the
agreement is called into question because of the overly restrictive form
requirement. The conclusion frequently drawn from those situations is that the
definition of writing, as contained in . . . [various] international legislative texts, is
not in conformity with international contract practices and is detrimental to the
legal certainty and predictability of commitments entered into in international
trade.288
Concerns about “overly restrictive form requirements” would also seem relevant in the
context of trust arbitration, since strict application of contractual requirements currently bar
arbitration of disputes in situations where the settlor’s intent to require arbitration is clear.289 The
question therefore is whether the international arbitral community’s proposed solution to the
problem of “overly restrictive form requirements” could be usefully applied directly to
international trust disputes and by analogy to domestic disputes.
As it turns out, efforts undertaken by the international community may in fact be helpful
to mandatory trust arbitration. The issue has been addressed as follows. In 2006, UNCITRAL
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published a recommendation directed at the various state parties to the New York Convention
(UNCITRAL Recommendation),290 stating that UNCITRAL “[r]ecommends that article II,
paragraph 2, of the [New York Convention] be applied recognizing that the circumstances
described therein are not exhaustive.”291 This means that the term “agreement in writing” can be
considered to include more than just an “arbitral clause in a contract” or a standalone “arbitration
agreement signed by the parties.”292 Instead, the UNCITRAL Recommendation encourages
widespread relaxation of existing form requirements.293
Because the UNCITRAL Recommendation is suggestive rather than mandatory, it need
not be applied by national courts.294 However, the Recommendation should nevertheless be
given serious consideration by judges in the U.S. and elsewhere, since established principles of
international law indicate that courts construing an international treaty should take into account
“‘the postratification understanding’ of signatory states,” which would include documents such
as the UNCITRAL Recommendation.295
The UNCITRAL Recommendation applies to all arbitration agreements and awards
falling under the New York Convention and is therefore relevant to most, if not all, international
trusts.296 There are two times when courts will have the opportunity to consider the UNCITRAL
Recommendation in the context of a trust dispute: (1) at the initial stage of the dispute, when a
party seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement, and (2) at the end stage, when a party seeks to
290
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enforce an award under the Convention.297 That means that courts facing either a motion to
compel arbitration or a motion to enforce an arbitral award under the New York Convention can
rely on the UNCITRAL Recommendation to adopt a flexible, pro-arbitration approach to the
definition of an “agreement in writing.”298
Having said that, the UNCITRAL Recommendation does not provide any detailed
information about what can be considered an “agreement in writing” under this more expansive
reading of the New York Convention.299 Nevertheless, some guidance may be sought from a
report put together by a UNCITRAL working group in 2005, just prior to the formal approval of
the Recommendation.300 That report indicated that a number of countries allowed parties to rely
on part performance (estoppel) and incorporation by reference to offset the strict application of
the writing requirement, among other things.301 This suggests that the concepts of deemed
acquiescence and conditional transfer (which incorporate principles of estoppel) could fall within
the expansive approach to form requirements advocated by the UNCITRAL Recommendation,
thus allowing international trust arbitration to benefit from the pro-enforcement bias of the New
York Convention.302 Indeed, this appears somewhat consistent with existing U.S. precedent,
since one U.S. court has already used principles of equitable estoppel to overcome the technical
absence of a “writing” in a trust-related dispute.303 Incorporation by reference has also been used
to allow arbitration of internal trust matters based on an arbitration provision found in a side
agreement.304
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Parties and courts seeking additional guidance on how to interpret the UNCITRAL
Recommendation can also look to the 2006 version of the Model Arbitration Law for
assistance.305 UNCITRAL was working on the revisions to the model law at the same time it
was drafting the UNCITRAL Recommendation and clearly intended the two documents to be
read together.306 Indeed, it appears that the UNCITRAL Recommendation was meant to
liberalize form requirements in the international realm while revisions to Article 7 of the Model
Arbitration Law were meant to have a similar effect at the national level.307
Article 7 of the revised Model Arbitration Law contains the definition of an arbitration
agreement and therefore addresses the same issues as Article II of the New York Convention.308
Notably, UNCITRAL proposed two different alternatives with respect to the revised version of
Article 7, and both include certain innovations that could affect mandatory trust arbitration.309
For example, both Option I and Option II of the revised version of Article 7 of the Model
Arbitration Law eliminate the need for the parties to have signed the arbitration agreement in
question.310 This obviously removes one of the primary problems facing mandatory trust
arbitration, particularly with respect to disputes involving beneficiaries.311
However, Option II goes even further in its relaxation of form requirements, stating that
an “‘[a]rbitration agreement’ is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain
disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
305

See Model Arbitration Law, supra note 216.
See General Assembly Resolution, Revised articles of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, and the recommendation regarding the interpretation of
Article II, paragraph 2, and article VII, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, 10 June 1958, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/33 (Dec. 18, 2006) (noting that the
connection between the revised Model Arbitration Law and the UNCITRAL Recommendation constitutes a means
of promoting uniformity in the interpretation and application of the New York Convention).
307
See UNCITRAL Note, supra note 286, ¶¶8-9, 35-37.
308
See New York Convention, supra note 143, art. II(2); Model Arbitration Law, supra note 216, art. 7;
UNCITRAL Note, supra note 186, ¶8.
309
See Model Arbitration Law, supra note 216, art. 7.
310
See id.; UNCITRAL Note, supra note 286, ¶¶11-12; Meijer & Guzman, supra note 39, at 143-45.
311
See supra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
306

62

relationship, whether contractual or not.”312 Because Option II does not mention the need for the
arbitration provision to appear in a contract, jurisdictions adopting this provision would likely
have few, if any, problems enforcing a mandatory arbitration provision found in a trust.
The most direct benefits of the relaxed form requirements in the revised Model
Arbitration Law will be felt by parties to an arbitration proceeding in a jurisdiction that has
adopted the 2006 version of the Model Arbitration Law.313 Although neither the United States
nor England have adopted the Model Arbitration Law, seven U.S. states have.314 However, the
impact of the Model Arbitration Law extends beyond arbitrations seated in a Model Arbitration
Law jurisdiction.315
Under Article VII(1) of the New York Convention, parties to an international arbitration
may take advantage of any national law that provides an easier route to enforcement than that set
forth in the Convention.316 Notably, this includes provisions regarding form requirements.317
Therefore, parties seeking to enforce an arbitral award in a jurisdiction that has adopted the 2006
version of the Model Arbitration Law will also be able to rely on these relaxed form
requirements.318
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The innovations reflected in the UNCITRAL Recommendation and the Model
Arbitration Law bode well for the future of both commercial and trust arbitration.319 However,
settlors should nevertheless exercise caution and make sure that any arbitration provisions
located in a trust comply with currently existing rules regarding form requirements and
operability of the arbitration agreement. This can be particularly challenging in international
disputes, since drafters need to “ensure that formal and substantial validity requirements for a
valid ‘arbitration agreement’ are met for both the lex arbitri and law governing the arbitration
agreement.”320

c.

An arbitral clause that is binding on the party seeking to avoid arbitration

The third issue to discuss is whether an arbitration clause found in a trust can be considered
binding on the party seeking to avoid arbitration.321 Rather than focusing on the form of the
arbitration provision, this concern focuses on whether there is adequate consent to support
arbitration. This question can be considered from two perspectives: that of the settlor and that of
parties other than the settlor. Each is addressed in turn.

i.

Settlor consent

In some ways, it may seem strange to ask whether a settlor has consented to arbitration, since the
settlor is the one who created the trust with the mandatory arbitration provision in the first place.
However, settlor consent is essentially what is at issue when a party challenges a trust on
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grounds such as undue influence, lack of capacity, fraud, duress, forgery or mistake, since the
claim is that neither the underlying document (i.e., the trust) nor the arbitration agreement found
in the trust ever came into effect.322 Challenges to trusts based on incapacity and similar
concerns are made relatively frequently, so this is a concern that will arise with some regularity.
The first thing to note is that those who seek to impeach an arbitration provision in a trust
based on a challenge to the trust itself may only do so if the challenge denies the existence of the
trust in its entirety.323 If a party bases its claim on any portion of the trust, then the arbitration
clause will remain in effect, since it is impossible to make a claim under the trust while
simultaneously denying its validity.324
Some commentators distinguish clearly between the arbitration of challenges to the trust
and the arbitration of disputes arising under the trust, stating that:
an arbitrator whose authority to adjudicate a . . . [trust] dispute derives from a
clause in the . . . [trust] itself should have no authority to decide a claim that the . .
. [trust] is invalid on grounds of improper execution, lack of mental capacity,
undue influence or testamentary fraud. Such a view would give the arbitrator the
sole authority to interpret the . . . [trust’s] provisions but not to hear challenges to
the . . . [trust’s] validity.325
This approach is consistent with the analytical approach used outside the context of
mandatory arbitration, in that courts faced with claims of undue influence, lack of capacity,
fraud, duress and mistake in other areas of trust law are just as likely to invalidate the entire trust
as they are to sever the offending provision.326 Indeed, one court considering arbitration of a
trust dispute appears to have adopted precisely this type of all-or-nothing approach after it was
“faced with an arbitration agreement in which no single provision [could] be stricken to remove
322
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the unconscionable taint.” 327 Because the impropriety was said to be infused throughout the
arbitration agreement, the court struck the arbitration provision in its entirety.328
This approach would of course be highly problematic if it were applied to mandatory
trust arbitration, since claims regarding lack of capacity, fraud, duress or mistake could routinely
invalidate arbitration provisions found in trusts. However, this is another area where arbitration
law might provide a useful framework for analysis.
Courts and commentators considering arbitration in other areas of law recognized early
on that the effectiveness of the arbitral regime would be put in jeopardy if parties could avoid
arbitration simply by alleging that lack of capacity, fraud, duress, forgery or mistake not only
invalidated the substantive agreement but also impeached any arbitration agreement located
within the underlying contract.329 The arbitral community therefore developed the principle of
separability, which in general terms states that challenges to the validity or existence of the
contract in which an arbitration agreement is found do not affect the validity or existence of the
arbitration agreement itself.330 This proposition holds true even in cases where the claims
question the quality or existence of the consent of the signatories, as is the case in challenges
based on lack of capacity, fraud, duress, forgery and mistake.331
While the basic principle of separability can be stated succinctly, the doctrine’s precise
parameters vary somewhat according to national law. Some countries take the view that the only
time a claim will be heard by a court is if the party challenges the validity of the arbitration
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agreement itself (as opposed to the document in which the agreement is found) or if the party has
specifically given the issue of validity to the court.332 Other jurisdictions – most particularly the
United States – make further distinctions in their application of the principle of separability.333
The separability analysis in the United States is based on two U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.334 and Buckeye Check
Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna.335 The essential holding of Prima Paint is that “claims of fraudulent
inducement, directed at the underlying contract and capable of rendering it voidable, [do] not
impeach the arbitration clause contained in that contract.”336 Buckeye Check Cashing extended
this basic principle to “cases involving claims that the underlying contract was void or illegal.”337
Thus, “a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the
arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.”338
Although Buckeye Check Cashing expressly held that the analysis was to be the same
regardless of whether the underlying contract was said to be void or voidable, “U.S. courts have
adopted different approaches to the effects of the separability presumption depending on whether
(a) the validity, legality, or continued effectiveness of the underlying contract is challenged; or
(b) the existence of the underlying contract is challenged.”339 The first category of cases – which
includes matters concerning “fraudulent inducement, fraud, lack of consideration, illegality . . .
[and] mistake” – can be heard by the arbitrator,340 although the decision to give the issue to the
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arbitral tribunal does not constitute a final determination of the merits of the issue, since the
arbitrators may ultimately decide that the challenge successfully impeaches the arbitration
agreement.341 Instead, this aspect of separability simply reflects a decision about jurisdictional
competence and who – the court or the arbitrator – is to hear the argument about the substantive
validity of the arbitration agreement.342 This is also the approach used for trust-related disputes
that do not involve challenges to the capacity of the settlor.343
Cases involving challenges to the existence of the underlying contract are more difficult,
since Buckeye Cashing only addressed contract validity and not the question of whether any
agreement between the parties was ever concluded.344 As it currently stands, no consensus in the
United States exists as to whether “claims of lack of capacity or authority, directed at the
underlying contract, also necessarily impeach the associated agreement to arbitrate.”345 A
similar amount of discord exists with regard to the question of who – the court or the arbitral
tribunal – has the jurisdictional authority to decide issues relating to the continued existence of
an arbitration agreement found in a contract that has been challenged on grounds such as lack of
capacity or authority, lack of consent, duress or forgery.346 This means that a court could order
the parties to arbitration to decide whether the arbitration agreement exists even in cases where
the underlying contract never came into existence, although the opposite is also possible.347
The unpredictability of this approach has led to numerous criticisms,348 and these issues
will doubtless continue to develop over the coming years. However, the question for this Article
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is what effect, if any, the U.S. separability analysis has on trust disputes.349 Only a few courts
have addressed this issue, but the decisions already demonstrate the same kind of difficulties that
arise in disputes outside the trust context.
So far, three alternatives appear to exist. First, some courts take the view that the
standard separability analysis does not apply to trust disputes. For example, Spahr v. Secco
considered what effect, if any, the alleged mental incapacity of the settlor might have on the
arbitration of a dispute related to the trust.350 After reviewing relevant precedent regarding
separability, the court concluded that:
the analytical formula developed in Prima Paint cannot be applied with precision
when a party contends that an entire contract containing an arbitration provision is
unenforceable because he or she lacked the mental capacity to enter into the
contract. Unlike a claim of fraud in the inducement, which can be directed at
individual provisions in a contract, a mental capacity challenge can logically be
directed only at the entire contract.351
Because challenges based on lack of mental capacity “naturally go[ ] to both the entire
contract and the specific agreement to arbitrate in the contract,” the decision was that disputes
based on mental incapacity should be heard in court, not in arbitration.352
While the court’s analysis was clear, the decision in Spahr was handed down prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Buckeye Cashing and may therefore no longer be good law.353
However, if allowed to stand, this approach would negate the concept of separability in trust
disputes.354 Courts adopting this view would likely not only refuse to enforce an arbitration
provision found in a trust whenever a challenge was made to the mental capacity of the settlor,
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but would also refuse to order arbitration of trust disputes in cases involving duress and
forgery.355
However, this is not the only possible approach to separability. Other courts appear
inclined to adopt the standard separability analysis. For example, in Regions Bank v. Britt, the
court was asked to decide whether and to what extent an arbitral tribunal could consider trustrelated claims that purportedly affected a party’s statutory succession rights.356 Although this
challenge was not based on the alleged incapacity of the settlor, it did attack the underlying
validity or existence of the trust in which the arbitration provision was found.357 Ultimately, the
court found that the issue could and more properly should be heard in arbitration, based on the
rule in Prima Paint.358 Interestingly, the court here explicitly distinguished between issues
involving substantive validity and jurisdictional competence, and gave the question of
substantive validity to the arbitrator.359
A third approach to the issue of separability is exemplified by Weizmann Institute of
Science v. Neschis, which considered whether and to what extent an arbitral award rendered in
Liechtenstein should be given preclusive effect in a U.S. court proceeding involving claims that
were very similar to those determined in the arbitration.360 One of the issues raised in the
arbitration involved the mental capacity of the settlor, who was alleged to have been suffering
from Alzheimer’s disease at the time he established several foundations (“stiftung”), which are
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Liechtenstein’s version of a trust.361 The arbitration provision in question was located in the
charter establishing the foundation.362
At no point did the court in Weizmann Institute take the position that issues of settlor
capacity could not be heard in arbitration. Instead, the judge refused to hear argument on matters
relating to the mental capacity of the settlor, based on principles of collateral estoppel.363 This
suggests that a per se rule barring arbitration of trust disputes involving the mental capacity of
the settlor would not necessarily be appropriate, despite the analysis in Spahr v. Secco.364
Other nations have separability analyses that are considerably less complicated than that
used in the United States. For example, the English approach to separability is embodied in the
Arbitration Act 1996, which states that:
[u]nless otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitration agreement which forms or
was intended to form part of another agreement (whether or not in writing) shall
not be regarded as invalid, non-existent or ineffective because that other
agreement is invalid, or did not come into existence or has become ineffective,
and it shall for that purpose be treated as a distinct agreement.365
This provision could very well be interpreted as covering an arbitral clause found in a
trust, since there is no requirement that the underlying agreement be valid or effective as a
contract or even be in writing.366 Recent judicial statements also suggest that questions
regarding settlor capacity can and should be heard in arbitration, particularly in the context of
commercial trusts. For example, Lord Hoffman of the House of Lords (the highest court in
England prior to the formation of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in October 2009)367
recently opined that:
361
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the construction of an arbitration clause should start from the assumption that the
parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to have intended any dispute arising
out of the relationship into which they have entered or purported to enter to be
decided by the same tribunal. The clause should be construed in accordance with
this presumption unless the language makes it clear that certain questions were
intended to be excluded from the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.368
Lord Hope of Craighead took a similar view, noting that no international transaction,
particularly of the type at issue in the case at bar, “is complete without a clause which identifies
the law to be applied and the method to be used for the determination of disputes.”369 While
these statements were made regarding claims of bribery in the context of an external trust dispute
involving a commercial trust, and thus may be limited in terms of their applicability to internal
trust disputes, the decision nevertheless provides a useful enunciation of the English view of
separability, particularly in the context of commercial relationships.370 The decision is also
consistent with a similarly commercial interpretation that was applied several years earlier in a
dispute involving the construction of an arbitration provision found in the trust deed of a
business trust.371
Other states appear to view separability in much the same light. For example, the
German approach to separability has been said to be analogous to that of England.372
Liechtenstein also appears to have adopted a pro-arbitration approach to matters of separability,
even in cases involving the mental capacity of the settlor of a trust.373
When contemplating issues of separability going forward, courts should consider whether
it is appropriate to adopt a different approach for challenges to trusts or whether consistency
should be the goal regardless of the subject matter of the dispute. Certainly if trusts are seen as
368
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reflecting contractual qualities, then a unified approach to separability would appear most
appropriate, with no distinction as to the subject matter of the dispute.
However, it does not necessarily follow that a non-uniform approach to separability
would be acceptable even if trusts were considered to be primarily or even exclusively donative
in nature. Separability is based on principles of consent, and it should not matter whether that
consent is unilateral in nature (as it would be under a donative theory of trusts, where only one
person – the settlor – can be said to have “consented” to the trust arrangement) or multilateral374
(as would be the case under a more contractual approach, wherein each of the various parties is
said to have actually or constructively agreed to the trust scheme).375 The only relevant question
is whether the consent at issue is sufficient to support arbitration or whether there are enough
doubts about the nature and quality of consent that the arbitration agreement should be
impeached.
Adopting an approach to separability that is consistent across subject matters would
appear particularly appropriate given the large and increasing number of commercial trusts that
are in use today.376 It has been suggested that commercial trusts are best analyzed through a
contractual lens,377 and any disparate treatment of commercial trusts based on a donative
rationale would not appear in line with contemporary commercial practices. This is especially
true in jurisdictions such as England, where separability is considered in light of the reasonable
expectations of a rational commercial actor.378
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Notably, a rule that required consistency in the application of the principle of separability
regardless of the subject matter of the dispute would not necessarily lead to the arbitration of all
trust disputes. Instead, such a determination would simply defer the question to pre-existing
principles of national arbitration law. While this could lead to some disputes about the validity
of an arbitration provision found in a trust being heard in arbitration and others being heard in
court, this would simply reflect what happens elsewhere in that jurisdiction. Furthermore,
application of the standard separability analysis would still support the notion that an arbitral
clause found in the trust can be considered binding vis-à-vis the party against whom the
arbitration is brought.

ii.

Consent of parties other than the settlor

Consent issues are not limited to concerns relating to the settlor. In fact, the more commonly
analyzed question is whether a mandatory arbitration provision can be considered binding on
persons other than the settlor (i.e., trustees and beneficiaries).379
The analysis here is similar in ways to that regarding the validity, effectiveness and
operability of the arbitration provision itself.380 An arbitral clause in a trust is considered
operable with respect to trustees and protectors to the extent that those persons agree to act under
the terms of the trust, whether that agreement is reflected in the trust itself or in an accompanying
document.381 Arbitral provisions are considered operable vis-à-vis beneficiaries through
application of the concepts of deemed acquiescence and conditional transfer.382
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Although these techniques are used to satisfy certain formal requirements regarding the
operability and effectiveness of an arbitration provision, that is no bar to their also being used to
demonstrate how and why various parties can be said to have consented to the arbitration
agreement. Arbitration law adopts a similar methodology with respect to non-signatories, using
the same theories not only to identify which parties can be held to the terms of the arbitration
agreement but also to excuse perfect compliance with form requirements.383
Because conditional transfer and deemed acquiescence have not been well-tested in the
context of mandatory arbitration,384 settlors often seek alternative means of binding various
parties to the arbitration.385 One mechanism that has been discussed by a number of
commentators involves the use of a forfeiture or in terrorem provision.386
In terrorem provisions typically state that any party who challenges a trust or will forfeits
any rights he or she may have under the instrument. In the context of mandatory arbitration,
forfeiture is triggered by a challenge to the use of arbitration to resolve a particular dispute.387
Although such language obviously provide a strong incentive for beneficiaries to agree to
arbitration, in terrorem clauses are problematic for several reasons.388
First, in terrorem provisions are by no means universally embraced, even as a general
matter. Indeed, courts often refuse to enforce such provisions if a party has probable cause to
bring the claim.389 Second, in terrorem clauses are particularly suspect in the context of
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mandatory arbitration, since threatening to revoke a benefit under the trust through a forfeiture
provision could be seen as “vitiat[ing] the freedom of will required to contract, and so render the
[arbitration] agreement voidable.”390 Third, an in terrorem provision could be considered an
impermissible attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the court and hence be void ab initio.391
Therefore, while some commentators take the view that requiring a legatee or beneficiary to
“forfeit her interest should she decline to respect the testator’s wishes with respect to arbitration
of will [or trust] contests should not discourage any truly meritorious . . . contest [, since s]uch a
contest may still be brought,”392 the consensus appears to be that settlors should avoid trying to
force beneficiaries into arbitration through use of a forfeiture clause.393
An interesting concept that has not been explored is the possible use of an incentive in
connection with a pre-dispute arbitration agreement concluded by the trustee after the creation of
the trust but before the dispute arises. This sort of arbitration would be mandatory in that the
trustee would be required to seek pre-dispute arbitration agreements with other potential parties
to an internal trust dispute (i.e., any actual or potential beneficiaries as well as any current or
successor trustees and protectors) by virtue of a direction in the trust. However, the arbitration
provision could also authorize the trustee to make an immediate payment to these parties in
consideration of the agreement. While this approach is not precisely the same as the type of
mandatory trust arbitration that is the topic of the current Article, it does (1) effectuate the intent
of the settlor, at least to some degree,394 (2) create explicit bilateral contracts that would meet any
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necessary form requirements395 and (3) avoid concerns about vitiating the beneficiaries’ consent,
since it acts as a positive, rather than negative, incentive to arbitrate.396
Although this is an interesting proposition, it is somewhat problematic in that it creates an
additional, unnecessary and potentially expensive hurdle for settlors to overcome before their
wishes vis-à-vis arbitration can be effectuated. It may very well be that a settlor does not want to
make provisions for a beneficiary if that person does not want to resolve any disputes in
arbitration, and it seems contrary to established principles of trust law to require the settlor to put
that condition in a document other than the trust for that condition to be given effect. This
approach would also give the trustee more power to initiate arbitration than the settlor, which is
again contrary to basic principles of trust law.397 Since this option is problematic as both a
practical and jurisprudential matter, it is therefore better to rely on deemed acquiescence and
conditional transfer as an appropriate means of binding all parties.398

4.

Proper representation

The fourth concern relating to mandatory arbitration of trust disputes involves the need to ensure
that all interested parties are properly represented in the proceedings.399 Here, the issue is how
best to protect the rights of beneficiaries who may be unascertained, unborn or legally
incompetent at the time the dispute arises.400
Issues of this nature may appear somewhat unusual to lawyers who do not routinely work
with trusts, since very few areas of law require courts or arbitrators to consider the rights of
395
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persons who are not actually present in the dispute. One of the few exceptions is the class action
and its corollary, the class arbitration, wherein a few named individuals bring a claim on behalf
of a large number of unidentified others.401 While trust disputes are not representative in nature,
they do share some attributes with class claims,402 most prominently their ability to determine the
rights of persons not actually present.403
However, rather than addressing the collective nature of trusts through class relief, courts
consider trust proceedings to be in rem, with decisions binding “all persons having adequate
notice, whether or not they actually participate in the proceeding.”404 This process requires a
court or arbitral tribunal to give special consideration to a number of related factors, such as who
should have notice of a trust proceeding, how notice must be given to those persons and what
sort of procedures must be used to protect the rights of all interested parties, regardless of
whether they are present or not.405
The first task – identifying who should be given notice of a trust dispute – requires a
careful reading of the trust document as well as a detailed knowledge of the context in which the
trust operates. For example, some beneficiaries may not be identified in the trust by name.
Although this practice may seem unusual to non-specialists, it has long been condoned by trust
law for several reasons. For example, a trust may endure for a very long period of time, which
means that settlors may need to identify beneficiaries by class so as to ensure that all relevant
persons are captured within the trust provisions.406 Alternatively, a settlor may want to give the
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trustee the discretion to determine who a beneficiary should be or whether a disbursement under
the trust is even proper.407 Requiring all these elements to be outlined in the trust itself would
mean that the trust would have to be constantly amended to take changing circumstances into
account. In some cases, it would be impossible to provide the requisite amount of detail.408
Either way, one of the major benefits of the trust – flexibility – would be severely limited or
destroyed.
It is also possible that potential parties to a trust dispute are not apparent from the face of
the trust instrument. Instead, these persons’ interests in the dispute arise as a matter of law,
typically either marital or succession law.409 Although this issue may be considered most often
in the context of private family trusts, marital and succession rights can also affect commercial
trusts.410
In either case, a court may be able to identify these potential parties by relationship but
may not be able to bring any actual, living persons into the dispute because these persons are
unascertained, unborn or legally incompetent at the time the trust dispute arises.411 In litigated
disputes, the issue has been resolved by allowing the court “to appoint a person to represent the
interests of such beneficiaries,” although “even then, any compromise of the litigation has to be
approved by the court.”412 In England, the person named to protect the beneficiaries’ claims,
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called a “special representative,” cannot have any independent interest in the dispute itself.413
Other jurisdictions, such as the United States, either appoint an independent representative
similar to a special representative or allow an existing beneficiary who shares the absent
beneficiary’s interests to protect the absent beneficiary’s claims in a practice known as “virtual
representation.”414 Minors and other legally incompetent persons (such as the mentally
incapacitated) may have legal representatives, typically referred to as guardians, already in
place.415 The question therefore becomes whether these sorts of representative mechanisms can
be used in arbitration.
The answer may depend on whether the trust instrument specifically describes the
representative mechanism that is to be used. For example, it has been said that:
[t]here appears to be no reason why the court would not grant a stay [of litigation]
to the trustee on the sole ground that the beneficiary is not properly represented in
the arbitration. If the arbitration provision is properly drawn to provide for
adequate representation, then the child [or other beneficiary] should be bound to
take the benefit of it.416
In drafting such a provision, the settlor should be sure to “provide how incapacitated,
unascertained and unborn beneficiaries can come (or be brought) forward to make their claims . .
. . The arbitral tribunal could determine who should be served with notice of the arbitration, in
the same way as, in court proceedings, a judge can.”417 Furthermore, “[t]o avoid problems the
trust deed should provide for payment of . . . [special or virtual representatives] out of the trust
fund.”418
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Trustees who are not given explicit powers to appoint special or virtual representatives
could attempt to do so based on their residual discretionary powers to resolve trust disputes.
This approach has not been frequently discussed by commentators and may therefore be more
open to debate. However, any efforts by trustees to create their own mechanisms for appointing
special or virtual representatives would likely be bolstered by any statutory provisions allowing
trustees to pursue nonjudicial means of dispute resolution.419
Although the use of special or virtual representatives in mandatory arbitration appears
relatively straightforward, some problems may nevertheless arise. For example, there are those
in the trust community who take the view that self-help on the part of either the settlor or trustee
is inappropriate and that “legislation would have to be enacted to enable arbitration to deal with
the problem of incapacitated, unborn and unascertained beneficiaries.”420 While this view is by
no means universally held,421 it is certainly true that states retain a public policy interest in the
protection of certain vulnerable parties in both litigation and arbitration.422 However, most
jurisdictions also retain the ability to vacate an arbitral award or refuse enforcement if the award
violates procedural due process or the public policy of the state.423 The interests of any
unascertained, unborn or legally incompetent parties would therefore likely be sufficiently
protected through standard procedures relating to judicial review of arbitral awards.424
Concerns also exist with respect to questions as to whether the court – as opposed to the
arbitral tribunal – must approve any settlement or compromise of a trust dispute involving an
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unascertained, unborn or legally incompetent party.425 While arbitrators are entirely competent
to enter an award on an agreed settlement as a matter of arbitration law,426 some jurisdictions
may oppose similar actions in the trust context because the judicial duty to approve voluntary
disposition of a trust dispute is considered non-derogable.427 Other jurisdictions may see no
problems with permitting an arbitral tribunal to step into the shoes of the court in this regard.428
Notably, if this issue turns on the proper interpretation of a statute providing the court with
exclusive jurisdiction over a particular matter, then it might be better analyzed as a type of
arbitrability concern.429
Challenges could also arise as to the competency of a particular representative. However,
this appears to be less of a problem, since it has been said that “[o]ne can leave it to the good
sense of the arbitrator to provide for due process and a fair hearing by appointing appropriate
skilled independent persons to represent minors and unborn and unascertained beneficiaries.”430
Finally, questions could also arise as to whether a representative needs to be appointed in
any particular set of circumstances. For example, it has been suggested that a representative
need not be appointed for a minor beneficiary if the minor is receiving a benefit under the trust,
since consent to receiving a benefit is not necessary in some jurisdictions.431 However, a
representative would be necessary in cases where a conflict of interest existed between a minor
and his or her natural guardian (i.e., the parent).432
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5.

Subject matter arbitrable

Finally, for a mandatory arbitration provision in a trust to be enforceable, “the subject matter of
the dispute [must be] arbitrable.”433 Arbitrability “determines which disputes can be submitted
to arbitration” and which are reserved to the exclusive purview of the courts.434
Although national and international laws on arbitration contemplate the possibility that
certain issues are non-arbitrable, seldom are the parameters of arbitrability firmly and clearly
drawn.435 Cross-border disputes, including those involving several U.S. states, are often
particularly difficult as a result of the need for potentially complicated conflict of laws
analyses.436
It might initially appear as if the various statutes allowing for the arbitration of certain
matters relating to trusts would be useful in this analysis. Certainly the provisions are helpful in
some regards, most particularly by suggesting that certain rights relating to trusts are freely
disposable and thus not inherently non-arbitrable.437 However, most of the legislation is written
in such a way that it is not clear whether the language covers mandatory arbitration provisions
found in trusts.438 Therefore, courts could limit application of the legislation solely to arbitration
agreements entered into by the trustee after the creation of the trust. In so doing, courts could
frame the trustee’s entering into an arbitration agreement as analogous to a post-dispute
arbitration agreement and a provision contained in the trust as analogous to a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement. While the analogy would not be entirely apt, in that trustees’ arbitration
433
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agreements would likely also be made pre- rather than post-dispute,439 courts might nevertheless
attempt to make this sort of distinction because it might allow them to rely on practices adopted
in other areas of arbitration wherein states have declared that certain rights may be made subject
to a post-dispute arbitration agreement but not a pre-dispute agreement.440
However, this sort of broad-brush analysis is somewhat crude, and there are better ways
to analyze the issue. For example, at its core, arbitrability focuses on whether the rights in
question are freely disposable by the parties.441 Because “the freedom to dispose of one’s rights .
. . implies the possibility to renounce such rights,”442 it is appropriate to ask whether
beneficiaries can dispose of all or some of their rights under a trust. As it turns out, beneficiaries
can disclaim any benefits they receive, which would suggest that beneficiaries’ rights are freely
disposable and thus arbitrable.443 While some difficulties could arise to the extent that trust law
limits beneficiaries’ ability to terminate a trust created for their benefit or to alter its terms,
arbitration of trust disputes would not be challenging the terms of the trust in any way but would
instead be upholding them.444
As illuminating as these analyses are, they are just a start. More detailed guidance must
be sought from general criteria regarding arbitrability.445
When considering whether a claim is arbitrable, courts and arbitrators typically look at a
number of factors, including the extent to which public interests are at stake, whether the dispute
involves significant inequalities in bargaining power, the effect of the decision on third party
439
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rights, the ability of arbitrators to grant legislatively-required remedies and whether arbitral
procedures (as opposed to judicial procedures) are adequate to resolve the dispute.446 Notably,
“the existence of a possibility for parties to express their will is an important factor” in favor of
arbitrability, a point which may be of particular interest in trust disputes, given trust law’s
traditional emphasis on settlor intent and the broad recognition of party autonomy in instruments
such as the Hague Convention on Trusts.447
Legislative intent is also central to the analysis.448 England and the United States do not
include language on arbitrability in their arbitration statutes, meaning that “questions whether or
not a particular dispute is arbitrable . . . turn almost entirely on judicial interpretation of other
statutes” or on general case law.449 Other jurisdictions address questions of arbitrability in their
arbitration statute, although the language is often quite general.450 Nevertheless, it is clear that
several of these statutes’ definitions of arbitrability are so broad that few, if any, problems will
arise regarding the arbitration of most trust disputes.451 Thus, for example:
Switzerland has adopted an independent substantive rule for the determination of
arbitrability, according to which any dispute involving an economic/financial
interest may be settled by arbitration, without any need to consider the possible
stricter rules of the law applicable to the merits of the dispute or the national law
of one of the parties. Apart from purely non-financial matters, arbitrability can
only be denied in an international arbitration with its seat in Switzerland for
claims which have exclusively been reserved for the state courts pursuant to
foreign mandatory provisions which have to be taken into account under public
policy considerations.
As nearly all types of trust disputes ultimately concern the distribution of
private wealth, the majority of such disputes can be arbitrated given the
liberal definition of arbitrability under Swiss law.452
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Notably, this does not mean that every trust-related dispute is arbitrable under Swiss law.
For example, issues regarding the provision of information to a beneficiary might not involve the
kind of financial or economic interests necessary for the matter to be considered arbitrable in
Switzerland.453
A number of other states also focus on commercial or economic interests when
considering the arbitrability of a particular issue and might therefore come to similar conclusions
as Switzerland regarding the arbitrability of trust disputes.454 For example, “[i]n the
Scandinavian countries, particularly in Denmark[,] it has been asserted that a specific provision
in the will calling for a certain ADR procedure is likely to be recognized.”455 Arbitration
provisions in testamentary and other non-contractual documents will be upheld in Germany and
Austria.456
However, even those countries that discuss arbitrability in their arbitration statute might
need to look to other legislation on occasion. For example, Swiss courts might prohibit the
arbitration of trust disputes in cases involving forced heirship, based on various statutes giving
courts exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving succession law.457
Regardless of whether a state defines arbitrability statutorily or through the common law,
the central question is whether a certain category of claims should be reserved to the courts.458
Traditionally, the analysis was conducted on the basis of entire subject matter areas: for
example, the court would ask whether all intellectual property claims were considered arbitrable
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or all consumer claims or all securities claims.459 As the general scope of arbitrability has
expanded, the practice has changed somewhat, with courts now making more nuanced
distinctions regarding the arbitrability of certain subsets of claims that fall within a field that is
generally considered arbitrable.460
For example, agency, franchise and exclusive distributor disputes are typically considered
as being amenable to arbitration.461 However, some courts have refused to enforce pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in cases involving the termination of the rights of agents, franchisees or
exclusive distributors, based on specific concerns about the economic vulnerability of those
parties.462 Notably, this limitation on arbitrability only affects specific types of claims, creating a
sub-class of non-arbitrable issues within a subject matter that is generally considered arbitrable.
This type of analysis is relevant to mandatory trust arbitration for two reasons. First,
these other inquiries focus on the protection of vulnerable parties, which is also an issue in trust
disputes involving unborn, unascertained or legally incompetent beneficiaries.463 Interestingly,
however, this may be one time when an emphasis on the donative nature of trusts may work to
the benefit of mandatory arbitration, since concerns about the arbitrability of issues involving
agents, franchisees and exclusive distributors typically focus on economic vulnerability arising
from an inequality of bargaining power.464 Since there can be no inequality of bargaining power
in a donative relationship, trust arbitration cannot be problematic in this sense.
Second, limitations on the arbitrability of certain types of agency, franchise or
distribution claims are typically based on statutes that appear to grant courts exclusive
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jurisdiction over a particular type of claim.465 Trust law is full of similar types of legislation that
ostensibly gives exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters to the courts.466
This latter issue is extremely important. Essentially the question is whether exclusive
jurisdiction provisions should be interpreted as a prohibition on forum selection clauses
(meaning that if the claim is heard in court, it must be heard in that particular court, which would
leave open the possibility of arbitration of that claim) or whether exclusive jurisdiction
provisions should be read as barring resolution of the claim in all other fora, arbitral or
judicial.467
When the matter is discussed in the context of agency, franchise and distribution claims,
the analysis concentrates primarily on international disputes, where the choice of court analysis
involves judicial venues in two different countries.468 In this context, the issues primarily
revolve around choice of law and whether a mandatory provision of law will be applied
extraterritorially.469 This obviously has relevance to international or interstate trust disputes,
which can involve similar choice of law concerns.470
However, this issue can also be considered from a purely domestic perspective, at least
when trusts are involved. Trust law has historically operated as a field apart, not only in terms of
its procedural and substantive law but also in terms of the venue in which these matters are
heard.471 Many states require claims regarding the administration and interpretation of trusts to
be heard in probate or chancery courts, a result that is achieved through exclusive jurisdiction
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clauses.472 Therefore, it may be that this sort of legislation should be more properly interpreted
as a type of internal sorting mechanism within a national judicial system rather than a method of
denying the availability of alternative means of dispute resolution. This conclusion is
strengthened not only by the fact that arbitration was relatively uncommon at the time that these
specialty courts first developed in medieval England but also by the fact that many of the
rationales supporting the creation of specialty courts (i.e., taking the dispute away from the jury
and giving it to a decision-maker with specialized substantive and procedural expertise) would
be met equally well by arbitration.473 As such, it seems inappropriate to conclude that these
statutes were meant to exclude arbitration, at least without more in-depth analysis.
In considering this issue, it is also important to be aware of the ramifications of a rule of
limited arbitrability. First, allowing these sorts of carve-outs diminishes predictability, since
parties will often be surprised by claim-specific limitations in an area of law that is known to be
generally arbitrable.474 Second, this sort of protective behavior is typically unnecessary. States
enact exclusive jurisdiction statutes because of the desire to protect vulnerable parties through
the application of certain substantive or procedural laws.475 However, arbitration of trust
disputes does not infringe on any necessary procedural protections,476 nor does it allow the
erosion of any necessary substantive principles of law.477 This is particularly true given the type
of judicial review that is available at the end of an arbitration.478 Thus, commentators have
concluded that:
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the fact that a legal provision gives express, or even exclusive, authority to a state
court does not prevent arbitration. These rules merely regulate the distribution of
disputes among the different courts of the State. They only indicate which court
has the authority when parties want to go to state courts. The rules say nothing
about the possibility to bring the dispute in a completely different arena.479
Although a detailed analysis of the question of limited arbitrability is beyond the scope of
the current Article, it is an issue that courts and commentators will need to consider in more
depth. Several factors may be relevant to that discussion. For example, because many of these
exclusive jurisdiction provisions have as their purpose the protection of certain principles of
substantive law, analysts may wish to consider the ability of parties to choose the law that
applies to trust disputes.480 The Hague Convention on Trusts may be a useful starting point for
this type of inquiry, since it reflects international consensus on a variety of relevant issues,
including the application of mandatory rules of foreign law.481 While the Hague Convention on
Trusts does not provide answers to all possible concerns (such as which rules of law are to be
considered non-derogable or are to be given extraterritorial application), it does usefully describe
the factors that are to be used in determining which law is most closely connected with the
trust.482
Courts and commentators will also need to determine whether judicial review of arbitral
awards adequately protects a state’s interest in the application of certain substantive laws.483
This analysis may focus on the extent to which an arbitral tribunal may or must apply mandatory
provisions of substantive law of a state other than that whose law is said to govern the dispute.484
Typically arbitrators are seen as having more freedom (or inclination) in this regard that state
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courts.485 It may also be appropriate to consider the propriety of early intervention in a trust
dispute (as would occur if the dispute were determined to be non-arbitrable in the context of a
motion to compel arbitration) versus late intervention (as would occur if the propriety of the
dispute resolution process were only considered in the context of a motion to vacate an arbitral
award or oppose enforcement thereof).486 Commentators appear to conclude that late
intervention is the more appropriate approach, for a variety of reasons.487
As complicated as the arbitrability analysis may appear to be, most commentators have
nevertheless concluded that internal trust disputes are or should be arbitrable, at least as a general
proposition,488 an approach that is consistent with the general trend toward increased arbitrability
in other areas of law.489 Although courts and commentators need to consider whether certain
discrete disputes can or should be carved out of the realm of generally arbitrable matters, those
discussions are best left until another day.490

IV.

Conclusion

As the preceding analysis suggests, mandatory arbitration of trust disputes gives rise to a number
of complicated jurisprudential questions. This Article has focused on the potential for the
impermissible ouster of the courts, the operability and effectiveness of the arbitration provision,
the extent to which an arbitration provision can be said to be binding on the party against whom
485
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the arbitration provision is sought to be enforced, proper representation of parties and
arbitrability.491 However, this Article has concluded that none of these matters gives rise to any
insurmountable obstacles, since viable solutions to potential problems can be identified as a
matter of either trust or arbitration law.
This is not to say that every jurisdiction considers mandatory arbitration of trust disputes
in the same light. There are some U.S. states, most prominently California and Texas, that have
denied the enforceability of mandatory arbitration provisions found in trusts, although the
decisions in question have been appealed to higher courts.492 However, other U.S. states have
taken a different approach. For example, Arizona and Florida have both embraced mandatory
trust arbitration legislatively while Michigan and New York have abrogated negative case law
through judicial means.493 Further development of mandatory trust arbitration may occur
through pro-arbitration provisions of the UTC and similar state legislation, even though there are
some questions about whether and to what extent the relevant language will apply to mandatory
arbitration provisions found in trust instruments.494
Advances have also been made in other countries. Among the common law jurisdictions,
Guernsey is perhaps the most notable, having adopted legislation allowing mandatory arbitration
of various kinds of internal trust disputes, although the Bahamas may soon become the most
welcoming offshore jurisdiction in this regard.495 England’s stance on this issue is less clear,
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with most of the recent developments coming as a result of commentary rather than judicial or
legislative means. Nevertheless, the stage appears set for potential developments in England in
this regard.496
Given the trust’s origins as a common law device, it is not surprising that the debate
about mandatory trust arbitration has been much less pronounced in civil law jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, a pro-arbitration approach appears to exist in a number of countries, including
Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.497
Despite these advancements, the law regarding the enforceability of arbitration provisions
found in trusts remains somewhat “thin and underdeveloped.”498 The lack of clear precedent or
legislation may slow the further development of trust arbitration in some jurisdictions, at least if
lawyers responsible for drafting trust instruments continue to hesitate about recommending
arbitration. However, settlors may not be as powerless as some people believe. Indeed, this
Article has identified a variety of ways that settlors can improve the enforceability of a
mandatory arbitration provision through proper drafting techniques.499
Although this Article has attempted to undertake a relatively comprehensive study of the
potential problems and solutions in this area of law, using an international and comparative
approach so as to assist courts, commentators and counsel working with both domestic and
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offshore trusts, more work remains to be done. For example, the trust bench and bar would both
benefit from a detailed discussion of the concept of limited arbitrability and the way in which
exclusive jurisdiction provisions should be interpreted.500 Additional research into the
differences between commercial and other types of trusts would also be useful, particularly if
those distinctions were found to affect the arbitration analysis.
Further consideration should also be given to the types of procedures that might be
appropriate in a trust arbitration. Courts are often more inclined to enforce arbitration
agreements and awards if the proceedings are governed by arbitral rules promulgated by a
reputable arbitral institution,501 so the trust and arbitral communities should work together to
ensure that trust-appropriate procedures are in place. Both the AAA and the ICC have begun to
address this issue, with the ICC focusing primarily on the creation of a model arbitration clause
(although that provision also includes several items affecting arbitral procedure) and the AAA
focusing on actual rules of procedure.502 However, initial inquiries suggest that both the AAA’s
trust arbitration rules and the ICC’s model clause could be improved in a variety of ways, so
there is more work to be done in this regard.503
While additional research in this field should be encouraged, it appears clear that further
development of mandatory trust arbitration is inevitable, given recent events in the United States
and elsewhere. Not only are parties in favor of dispute resolution procedures that promote speed,
efficiency, confidentiality, personal autonomy, cost-effectiveness and (in international disputes)
an increased likelihood of an internationally enforceable award, but so, too, are many
commentators and legislatures. While some courts continue to reflect a more conservative
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approach to the issue, many of the older, more problematic precedents have been abrogated in
recent years,504 thus opening the door to a more pro-arbitration policy. Trust law will also
undoubtedly benefit from the significant advances made in arbitration law and practice over the
last two to three decades. Given that “there seem to be no good current policy grounds for
permitting the inclusion of arbitration clauses in contracts but not trust deeds,”505 the trust and
arbitral communities should therefore move forward jointly to promote the continued
development of this area of law.
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